National Memorial Arboretum – Battle of the Somme 100 year Anniversary

To commemorate the centenary of the Battle of the Somme (30th June 1916 – 18th November 1916) we visited the National Memorial Arboretum in Staffordshire to pay our respects to those who lost their lives in service for their country. From what we understand, there were 419,654 Commonwealth casualties in the Somme Offensive, of which 95,675 were killed. On the first day alone 19,240 soldiers lost their lives. To remember those who died on 30th June, 19,240 soldiers are being painted, each soldier representing a life that was taken. My mum, sister and I have painted our own soldiers. Lasting 141 days, it is regarded as the bloodiest battle fought in British history. As A.P. Herbert wrote, ‘Every Englishman has a picture of the Somme in his mind, and I will not try to enlarge it.’ 

Is the Use of Force More Important than Persuasion to the Emergence of Authoritarian States?

Adolf Hitler and Fidel Castro were the authoritarian leaders of single-party states during the twentieth century; Hitler, leader of Germany, and Castro, leader of Cuba. This essay will aim to examine the periods in which these two leaders rose to power. For Hitler this was between 1919 and 1933 and for Castro, 1953 and 1959. To answer this question, it is important to acknowledge the significance of the roles of these individual leaders in contributing to the emergence of authoritarian states, for without them the use of force and persuasion would have had very little effect. It is also necessary to define the “use of force” as a physical act of coercion – e.g. involving the use of arms, as opposed to “persuasion”, a non-physical coercive method used to achieve political change. Whilst it is reasonable to argue that these two leaders used both force and persuasion in their rise to power, I would argue that Hitler appeared to rely more on persuasive methods, through his election campaigns and Nazi propaganda as opposed to Castro, who seemingly warmed more to the use of force as was shown in the Moncada Barracks attack, 1953 and in the strategic use of guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, this essay will focus on contrasting the effectiveness and thus importance of these two conflicting methods to the emergence of authoritarian states and as to whether the two were inherently inter-related or whether it was in fact other factors such as the pressures of the existing government which pushed for a revolutionary change to the ways both Germany and Cuba were being governed, and ultimately led to the emergence of an authoritarian state.

To begin with, it would appear that both Hitler and Castro initially sought to seize power through physical coercion i.e. force. For Hitler, this was the Munich Putsch in 1923 which saw the Nazis attempt to seize control of Munich, which subsequently resulted in the deaths of 16 Nazis and Hitler’s arrest. For Castro, this was the Moncada Barracks attack in 1953, in which he attempted to seize the military barracks which housed units of Batista’s army, intending to strike a blow to Batista’s repressive regime. This too was a failed attempt and resulted in Castro’s capture. Though these two events differ in terms of motives, Hitler wished to claim power, whilst Castro wished to establish the nationalists as a strong opposition; they both were carried out with violence or the threat of violence. From this we can suggest that particularly in this case, the use of force achieved little if not anything but humiliation for both the Nazis and the Cuban nationalists and did not contribute at all to the emergence of an authoritarian state. The effect of using force to establish power in both cases became not only irrelevant to the emergence of an authoritarian state, but actually worked to regress the possibility of one forming as both the image of the Nazis and the Cuban revolutionaries were tarnished. However, it was the aftermath of these two failed uses of force which was important to the emergence of an authoritarian state.

Correspondingly, it would appear that in both cases, the effective use of persuasion manifested itself out of the failures of using force to consolidate power. This was seen in both Hitler’s and Castro’s exploitation of their trials, as they sought to use them as an exercise to spread propaganda, which in turn led to increased support for the ideas which would contribute towards the emergence of an authoritarian state. The corruptness of the People’s Court meant that it allowed the putsch’s instigators the opportunity to present their political convictions – to which Hitler exploited and structured an impassioned speech which was aimed not at persuading the Court, but at every individual German citizen. Hitler stated that “the army which we have formed grows from day to day; it grows more rapidly from hour to hour”. From this excerpt alone we can infer that Hitler had a utopian vision of Germany, which, alongside his charisma and his patriotism, worked to persuade the German peoples to have faith that Germany would be great again. Hitler’s  mention of an army is interesting, as in reality, the German military had been severely reduced by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. However, he persuaded the people that a new nationalist army was growing, and that this army needed the co-operation of each individual German if Germany itself was to be saved. This alone encapsulated Hitler’s audience and worked to spread the idea of subordinating to a Nazi regime if it meant that Germany would restore its greatness. Similarly, Castro’s use of persuasion amassed the vital support which was needed to create an authoritarian state. He justified the Moncada Barracks through defending himself as being a committed Cuban patriot fighting for the liberty of the Cuban people. He made such bold claims as the restoration of the constitution and the redistribution of land to the people. All in all, Castro’s persuasive appeal to the Cuban people was taken to be such a threat that he was actually treated with lenience and only served two years in prison. From these two trials it can be suggested that persuasiveness was paramount to the emergence of an authoritarian state. An authoritarian state would not have been able to emerge without popular support. The initial failure of force worked to reduce the appeal of both the Nazis and Cuban revolutionaries. It was the persuasive methods such as the oratory skills of both leaders which worked to not only preserve their ideologies, but to also spread these beliefs to a greater number of people, despite their image being publicly scrutinised whilst in court. Unlike force, persuasiveness seemed to have the effect of appealing to the needs of the poorer classes. Even more, it concentrated primarily on the individual and convinced the ordinary citizen that their co-operation was needed in order to save the country from socio-economic collapse. Co-operation and support from the people were the essential components needed in order for an authoritarian state to emerge and to survive. Because of this, the importance of persuasion must not be underestimated as it managed to amass support, contrary to the initial use of force, which seemed to reduce it.

However, it can be argued that the use of force was sufficiently important to the emergence of authoritarian states. This was certainly the case for Hitler’s physical force, the SA (Sturmabteilung). The SA members felt a keen sense of brotherhood as they were directed by their leaders to attack communists and Jews. They led aggressive marches and torchlight processions which worked to terrify opponents into silence but also spread Nazi ideology to the German people. To contrast, the Granma attack in 1956 proved to be yet another failure for Castro in his use of force. Attempting to take Santiago and to amass risings all over Cuba, Castro’s ship was met by government troops and 70 Cuban revolutionaries were captured. In Hitler’s case, the implementation of force to orchestrate terror and submission to the Nazi Party was significantly successful. From this we can suggest that the use of force was very important to the emergence of authoritarian Germany as it had the effect of gathering support through an establishment of fear. Though these methods were harsh, they worked to discipline the people, a factor which was key to developing an authoritarian state in Germany. Nonetheless, in Castro’s case, the use of force was again completely detached from the emergence of an authoritarian state. The Granma attack was an embarrassment for the Cuban revolutionaries and had no impact on the emergence of an authoritarian state. This suggests that in Cuba the use of force was impractical and a weak course of action for consolidating power. Again, the failure of force became a prompt for the Cuban revolutionaries to shift towards persuasive methods in order to ensure Cuba’s transformation into an authoritarian state.

After the humiliation of the Granma attack, Castro’s shift to a more persuasive form of politics was confirmed in the effective use of propaganda. In an attempt to rebuild the 26th July Movement, Castro projected an image of himself in a number of interviews as the patriotic freedom fighter who sought to protect the oppressed Cubans from Batista’s repressive regime. The image of youthful revolutionaries fighting for a common cause gave both Castro and Che Guevara a heroic quality which worked to attract attention from the West. The effective use of propaganda was also used by Hitler. Hitler made use of his time in prison to write Mein Kampf, which historian Michael Lynch describes as “the nearest we have to a definitive analysis of National Socialism”. The text laid down his main political thoughts including his hatred of the Jews and Germany’s inevitable destiny as a great Aryan nation. The book was essentially an emotional appeal to the Germans to mark out their enemies and join the Nazis in bringing them down. The effective use of propaganda was a highly important tool for both Hitler and Castro to the emergence of an authoritarian state. For Castro, propaganda helped to draw support from the West and establish his cult of personality throughout Cuba. This heroic image of a soldier involved in a struggle to achieve revolution was what attracted and thus persuaded Cubans to side with the revolutionaries. If anything, the use of propaganda worked to camouflage Castro’s previous failures of using force, presenting the fight for revolution as an adventure and an act of great patriotism. The emotional appeal of Hitler’s Mein Kampf to all German peoples worked to establish a connection between Hitler and the lower middle class, persuading Germans that Nazism was right for Germany. Because of this, the importance of persuasion cannot be dismissed as it was for both leaders the most obvious way to connect indirectly to the people.

Lastly, though Hitler appeared to continue with methods of persuasion in order to establish an authoritarian state, Castro actually chose to revert back to using force. Hitler stated that “If out-voting them [Catholic and Marxist deputies] takes longer than outshooting them, at least the results will be guaranteed by their own constitution!”. From this we can suggest that Hitler had viewed the use of force in Munich with such failure that the use of persuasion was the only feasible way of achieving success. Indeed success in the Reichstag elections  in 1932 followed by Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor confirmed Richard J. Evans’ claim that the Nazi vote was a “protest vote”, an “emotional appeal that emphasized little more than the Party’s youth and dynamism“. Again it would seem that it was this continuous emotional persuasion to each German individual which achieved success above and beyond any use of force the Nazis had made up to this point of time. To contrast, Castro relied on guerrilla warfare to defeat Batista’s forces. Castro’s success with physical force actually persuaded the US to support the Cuban opposition groups which propelled the Cubans to advance on Havana. What can be drawn from these instances is that the use of force and the use of persuasion were both important to the emergence of an authoritarian state. Hitler’s decision to abandon the use of force indicates that in the case of Germany, the use of force actually defeated the possibility of the emergence of an authoritarian state. However, in the case of the final stages of defeating Batista’s forces it would seem that both the use of force and the use of persuasion were interrelated with each other. The effects of success with force actually brought on more success for the Cuban revolutionaries as it thus persuaded the US to withdraw support for Batista and favour the revolutionaries.

To conclude, it is simply illogical to assume that the use of force is more important than persuasion to the emergence of authoritarian states. It would seem that both Hitler and Castro had significant success when they resorted to non-physical acts of persuasion. Hitler found success in an emotional appeal to each individual German, promising that with Nazism would come the restoration of Germany into a great Aryan nation. Likewise Castro’s effective use of propaganda restored the faith which had been lost due to the Granma attack. If anything, it is justifiable to argue that the use of force had no importance at all to the emergence of authoritarian states. This was certainly the case for Hitler’s Germany. Though the SA did keep order on the streets and increased Nazi support through terror tactics, this is not a strong enough claim to argue that the use of force had much significance. It is reasonable to assume that the Munich Putsch was a propaganda success, however this surely strengthens the argument that persuasion was more important, more relevant to the emergence of an authoritarian state in contrast to the failure of the use of force. Similarly for Castro, the use of guerrilla warfare was undoubtedly an important component to the emergence of a Cuban authoritarian state, however this was helped by persuading the West to break off relations with Batista’s government. In both cases where the use of force appeared to have had success, the use of persuasion was also at hand. For this reason, it can be argued that the use of persuasion was able to act independent of the use of force, however this could not work vice versa. It is also reasonable to accept that there were factors outside the uses of force and persuasion which were important to the emergence of an authoritarian state. For instance, the Great Depression gave the Nazis a new relevance in Germany and provided them the platform to play on people’s angers over the crippled state of Germany. In the case of Cuba, some might argue that the role of the US was pivotal to the creation of an authoritarian state because after all, the US ended dealings with Batista in 1957, severely reducing the capabilities of his forces. However I would argue that both these factors came as a result of the use of persuasion, since its key motive was to amass support. All in all, the use of persuasion is undoubtedly more important than any other factor. It allowed for the spread of ideology, which thus led to increased support for nationalist groups which in turn led to the emergence of an authoritarian state.

Victoria and Albert Museum

Upon staying at my grandparents’ house in London we decided to make use of our time by visiting the Victoria and Albert Museum which is conveniently neighboured to South Kensington Station, so our worries of having to trek through the bitter cold weather were defused! 

Due to a busy time schedule we could not stay at the museum for too long but long enough to appreciate the huge array of artefacts that were on display. Cut for time, I chose to explore the “Medieval & Renaissance 1350-1600” exhibition which covered three entire floors. Having recently read a number of books detailing Renaissance Florence under Medici rule, it felt right to get a first-hand view of the objects which were present in a time and place which turned the very cogs of the historical period which would be come to be known as the Renaissance. 

I was first greeted by the pulchrous works of the artist Raphael who took over Michelangelo’s prominent role as the main artist in Florence. I was taken aback by the sheer scale of his paintings and what interested me was his constant depiction of biblical events which occurred in the New Testament. I was particularly analytical of his work “The Miraculous Draft of Fishes”, familiarising it with the Call of the Disciples, having studied the Gospel of Mark. What we can infer from this painting is that Raphael wishes to present Jesus as humanly suggested by the similarities in clothing between Jesus and the fishermen. The stark white robe covering Jesus’ underclothes is a massive contrast to the more neatly blended, complimentary colours which Raphael seems to use on the rest of the painting.

The Renaissance saw the birth of humanism, which was confirmed through the art which was produced in this period. The sculpture “The Rape of Proserpina” by Vincenzo de’ Rossi displays Pluto, the Roman King of the Underworld violently handling Proserpina who can be seen desperately struggling to break free from the clutches of the majesty of the dead. The negative connotations of this sculpture are only amplified by the choice of a depressingly dark bronze which confirms Proserpina’s ill-fate.

I also came across the Medici coat of arms (stemma) during the reign of Lorenzo il Magnifico’s son, Pope Leo X. It shows the six palle (balls) which were traditionally depicted on the Medici stemma. However, in addition to this, there is a tiara and crossed keys depicted which signify Giovanni de’ Medici’s ascendancy to the papacy.

Though what I was most excited about seeing was the “Labours of the Months”, produced by Luca della Robbia for Piero the Gouty’s study in the Palazzo Medici. It depicts the agricultural labours which occurred throughout the year, each of the twelve dishes having its own zodiac sign on it in correspondence to the depiction of day and night.

Attached are the photos I took on my phone whilst at the Museum.

  
    
                          
    
    
  

    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 

Why did the economic policies adopted between 1918 and 1924 arouse opposition within the Bolshevik Party and the USSR?

The period from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 up until the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924, was described by historian Russell Tarr as a “baptism of fire”. Marxist-Leninist historian Dmitri Volkogonov further commentated that “The movement for a just and classless society in Russia began with unbridled violence, denying millions of people all rights except the right to support Bolshevik policy.” Though these two perspectives on the state of Russia are far-fetched from each other, they both have implications that the transformation of a state that was economically broken, socially disintegrated and ideologically divided could only be achieved through brute force, a repression of democracy and a new dictatorship. The spring of 1918 only confirmed the deterioration of the economy with the collapse of the value of the rouble and soaring inflation. I will be examining the economic policies undertaken in Russia, from the campaign of “War Communism”, which a Leftist would argue was Lenin’s avid response to the civil war, to Trotsky’s proposal of a “New Economic Policy” that would at least provide the Russian populace with a little prosperity. Alongside my analysis of the economic policies, I will incorporate the various perspectives of the different groups that made up Russian society, whether it be from the angle of a Bolshevik Party member or from a Kronstadt sailor. Wherever necessary, I will also add the perspectives of well-regarded historians to support my arguments.

To begin with, post-revisionist historian Robert Service states that Lenin was “determined that the Bolsheviks should initiate the achievement of a world without exploitation and oppression.”. Though this was Lenin’s ideal picture of his utopian communist Russia, there is some fault with what Service says. One of the reasons as to why there was such a resentment for the economic policies was because of Lenin’s reliance on oppression of the Russian people in order to maintain the power and influence of the Bolshevik regime, and the peasantry were no doubt subject to this. Grain requisition and forced collectivisation was introduced as a result of the loss of Ukraine and the disbanding of highly profitable farms. Russell Tarr estimates that around 6,000,000 peasants lost their lives down to starvation because of War Communism. From this we can argue that one of the reasons as to why there was so much opposition to Russia’s economic policy was simply because it seemed to be doing a lot more damage than good. Though War Communism succeeded in providing the needs for Russia in the short term, it was simply not feasible to prolong this campaign as it had the effect of deteriorating the social conditions of Russia parallel to the crumbling of the economy. It seemed that the rights of the individual were ignored so long as the collective could continue to operate during the campaign. Orlando Figes points out the sheer lengths of terror the Bolshevik requisition squads resorted to in order to take the grain from the peasantry. Raping of the village folk and burning of villages were not an uncommon form of Bolshevik activity. Figes registers that the only reason as to why the peasantry complied to War Communism was purely out of fear and that indeed opposition to the Bolshevik regime and its economic policies was certainly rife, reflected in the outbreak of peasant rebellions. The disregard for the peasantry is what prompted Lenin to issue the New Economic Policy in which he said “Let the peasants have their little bit of capitalism as long as we have the power” when he realised that he could not afford to face increasing opposition from the peasantry, who made up the majority of Russia.

Furthermore, the worker class were another faction of the Russian community who were opposed to the economic policies laid forth by the Bolshevik Party. Figes points out that “the Bolsheviks themselves were talking about the disappearance of the working class by the spring of 1918”. Workers’ strikes were very common, even before the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921, all denouncing the new dictatorship Lenin was establishing. This was as a result of hostile opinion against Lenin’s introduction of compulsory labour for all citizens between 16-50 years of age and his creation of Vesenkha (the Supreme Council of the National Economy) which limited the power of the Workers’ Councils. We can acetate from this that War Communism was responded to with general resentment and that the workers were as much opposed to the economic policy as the peasants were. Gorky even went so far as to claim that “many workers spat whenever they heard the name of the Bolsheviks mentioned.” Most workers were bitterly opposed to the economic policies in Russia, however, the different groups had different reasons for being so. SR and Menshevik activists were against the Bolshevik regime entirely, regardless of the Bolshevik economic policies, as their vision of how Russia should be governed unsurprisingly differed greatly to the Bolsheviks’; to them, War Communism was simply driven by Bolshevik ideology. War Communism only provided these people with another reason to hate the Bolsheviks (the SR’s had already rejected the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) given that it seemed that nobody was really benefiting from it at all. This assumption is supported by the formation of the protest movement, “The Extraordinary Assemblies of Factory and Plant Representatives”, which was regarded as the most powerful and threatening anti-Bolshevik protest movement formed from the working class.

To add to the opposition of the workers to the economic policies, a “third toilers” revolution, this time in opposition to the Bolsheviks, was taking place. The Kronstadt rebellion, led by 16,000 soldiers and workers was instigated by the detestation over how little three years of communism had benefited Russia. Though the partakers of the rebellion were very much against the Bolshevik Party, they were once “the pride and joy of the revolution”. It is interesting to acknowledge how quickly Kronstadt gave up on the Bolsheviks, leaving us to question their reasons for being so opposed to the economic policies issued by the Bolsheviks. Bad harvests and grain requisition brought on famine and widespread suffering in both rural and urban Russia. The Kronstadt Soviet became a national voice which spoke out about the oppression of Russian communities, suggested in a Kronstadt resolution demanding “The liberation of all political prisoners of the Socialist parties, and for all imprisoned workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors belonging to workers and peasant organizations.” The Kronstadt can be seen as the “ideological club” against Leninism, they were the voice of the masses. So it is no surprise that the Bolsheviks faced even more opposition against their economic policies when they decided to stamp out the revolt through brutality, dissolving the Kronstadt Soviet, executing hundreds of ringleaders and expelling over 15,000 sailors from the Kronstadt fleet. We could argue that opposition against the economic policies was not just because of their unpopularity, but because of blatant ideological opposition to the Bolsheviks. Many were already discontent with the Bolsheviks’ brutal and repressive measures, they had made little progress since their victory in the civil war, so a controversial economic policy might just have been another factor that prompted people to oppose the party as a whole and not just simply its economic policies.

Alternatively, there was also strong opposition against the economic policies within the Bolshevik Party itself. A lot of emphasis has been placed on the opposition against War Communism and it would seem that it did retrieve much more widespread hatred as opposed to the New Economic Policy. However, to put it blunt, War Communism was encouraged by most Bolsheviks and detested by the rest of Russia, whereas the NEP was generally appreciated by Russians but was very divisive within the Bolshevik Party. Bolshevik Party members Shiliapnikov and Kollantai were opposed to reducing the power of the Trades Unions and the Workers’ Councils supported by the Democratic Centralists who resented the “dictatorship of party officialdom”. The Bolsheviks were the driving force for War Communism given that they could not rely on the rest of Russia to promote the policy, but given that Bolshevik Party members were opposed to the activities of the party, shows that it was not just anti-Bolsheviks who sought to oppose the Bolshevik regime, but the very advocators themselves. This is further emphasised by the divisiveness within the party over the NEP. Western historians such as Stephen Cohen would greatly sympathise for Right-Wing Bolshevik, Bukharin who defended the peasant-based socialism of the NEP. However, historian Mikhail Gorinov views the New Economic Policy very pessimistically, stating that ‘the threat of technical backwardness, the permanent danger of war, and the instability of the market cast very gravedoubt on the effectiveness of this variant’. And this is a very similar reflection of the divisiveness within the Bolshevik Party – the Right and the Left. Perhaps the most notable Leftist, Trotsky, was opposed to the New Economic Policy as he believed it to be a policy of ideological betrayal as it allowed elements of petty capitalism to return to Russia, which was completely undermining the purpose of socialism. It also stimulated opposition within the party as it allowed for an emergence of new Kulak and Nepmen classes who posed a threat to the party itself.

To conclude, I deem it fair to assume that there was much more widespread opposition against the Bolsheviks’ War Communism campaign as opposed to the New Economic Policy. However, this essay is not asking for comparisons between these two economic policies but merely for reasons as to why there was opposition. Having assessed the different perspectives from which the economic policies were seen, I’ve argued that it is unjust to simply assume that the overriding reason for discontent for the economic policies was purely because of their failures, for which I would stress much more emphasis on War Communism. Though this is a vital factor that must not be ignored, factors such as a strong number of anti-Bolshevik ideologues, divisions within the Bolshevik Party and the long-lasting effects of these policies must all be taken with as great an importance for reasons for opposition. And though this question extends itself to 1924, I would argue along with many other historians that the opposition against the Bolshevik economic policies ended in 1921, with the end of War Communism; if not so throughout the whole of Russia, definitely for those who were not involved directly with the Party. It is also interesting to consider the evolution of this opposition, as it would seem that between 1917-21, the economic policy conducted in Russia was very much a problem external to the Party, however in the years proceeding 1921, this transformed into an internal problem for the Party that most certainly did damage to its reputation and its socialist ideology which it had built itself upon.

 

 

What measures did the Bolshevik Party adopt to maintain control of Russia from the revolution of October 1917 to the death of Lenin?

One of the measures adopted by the Bolshevik Party was its response to its initial political unpopularity. It is first important to recognise that the Bolshevik Party did not have the support of the majority in 1917. It was found that the party had gained only a quarter of the seats during the elections, having been ousted by the Socialist Revolutionaries who had managed to achieve half of the seats and cement themselves as the most popular party. Lenin’s response to this Bolshevik upset was an immediate and rather desperate attempt to cure the unpopularity of the party and cement his control over a vast geographical distance. He did this through dissolving the Assembly which he believed was not an advocate of the domestic welfare the Bolsheviks promised to bring, which he coined “true democracy“. He also set up soviets all over Russia and decreed that any anti-Bolshevik parties must be expelled.

Furthermore, the Bolsheviks’ modus operandi for this cementation of control was through their extreme “Red Terror” campaign. Historiographers agree that the Red Terror officially began on 2nd September 1918 announced by Yakov Sverdlov, Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the future de jure Chief of State of the USSR. Though the Red Terror was short-lived, with its cancellation only a month after its initiation, it played a key role in the Communist exertion of power throughout Russia. The Red Terror was launched after a failed SR rebellion and a failed assassination attempt on Lenin. The Cheka conducted the Terror and its purpose was to encourage widespread oppression such as torture and mass killings of anti-Bolsheviks. This definitely allowed the Bolsheviks to maintain their control, with membership of both the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries declining by two-thirds.

Moreover, the Bolsheviks were also able to spread their influence and control through Russia due to their military capability. Ukraine was a key region due to its rich wheat areas, which was essential for Russia due to the severe food shortages as a result of the war. In 1920, the Bolsheviks smashed White resistance forces based in Ukraine which led to the flight of 150,000 Whites to Constantinople. The Bolsheviks also acquired success in the East, asserting their control over the Transcaucasian Republics. They managed to conquer Azerbaijan, Armenia and drove the White forces out of Georgia. They then found success in Central Asia, dominating the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. It would seem that geography played a key role in maintaining Bolshevik power. Geography meant an extension of popular support for the Bolsheviks, strengthening their control.

Also, another measure taken by the Bolsheviks to maintain control of Russia was “War Communism”. The Civil War tore the very fine fabric which was preventing Russia from falling completely apart. Industrial output had shrunk, there was a severe shortage of goods which consequently led to high inflation rates and food was scarce with bread rationing in Petrograd plummeting to just 50 grams per person a day by February 1918. The crisis of civil war, the poor social conditions and the collapse of the economy led to the introduction of War Communism. This was essentially Lenin’s solution to the food crisis and keeping the workers in the cities to produce munitions, vital war supplies and other desperately needed goods. War Communism involved grain requisitioning, banning of private trade, nationalisation of industry, labour discipline and rationing, which gained bitter opposition from both the proletariat and the peasantry, leading to rebellion, most notably the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921 which ended with the dissolution of the Soviet created by the sailors, the execution of hundreds of ringleaders and the expulsion of over 15,000 sailors from the fleet.

Accepting that War Communism was a failure, stating that the communist state was a man “beaten to within an inch of his life“, Lenin replaced it with the New Economic Policy (NEP). It allowed for private ownership of small-scale industry and replaced grain requisitioning with tax. Where War Communism failed in terms of Bolshevik control, the NEP most definitely made up for. The crisis gradually began to calm by 1922, helped by the £20,000,000 worth of aid from the American Relief Association. Agriculture seemed to have improved drastically with grain production having increased by over 50% by 1923. However improvements in agriculture were not supported by improvements in industry with industrial prices continuing to rise. Though industry would be found to recover after Lenin’s death. However, there was divided opinion over the NEP with many of the proletariat believing that this was a communist mechanism used to exploit the needs of the proletariat.

To conclude, the Bolsheviks adopted a number of different measures to maintain control of Russia. It would appear that Lenin kept Bolshevik power consistent through his disregard of debate and democracy, turning to more controversial tactics such as a personal dictatorship and the use of brute force to keep his communist regime intact. Though despite the controversy surrounding his measures, they no doubt contributed to the state becoming all-powerful.

Sources: Russia under Tsarism and Communism 1881-1953 by Chris Corin and Terry Fiehn, Article in History Review Issue 55

Compare and contrast the causes of, and the policies of the USA and the USSR during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

Photograph taken by a U-2 Spy Plane of Missile bases on Cuba

The aftermath of the Berlin Blockade demonstrated a clear ideological division between the US and the USSR as the West wished to rebuild the Germany economy in contrast to the USSR which wanted to continue with the repression of Germany in order to stamp out the potential threat a powerful Germany might pose. This led to the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic which only exacerbated tensions between the West and the East as these two countries became a physical division between capitalist and communist states. The partition of Germany indefinitely worsened problems in the long term as competing US and USSR foreign policies ultimately led to the construction of the Berlin Wall at 2:00 A.M. August 13th, 1961. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year revealed a further deterioration in relations between the US and the USSR with the USSR adopting a warningly offensive policy in contrast to the US which had no choice but to adopt a defensive policy in order to suppress the potentiality of a nuclear attack. Also, unlike the crisis of Berlin, a hardline military policy was taken by both sides which arguably had the result of bringing these two superpowers to the very brink of nuclear war. It is important to register that in order to answer this question, we must take into account that the policies of both countries can also be viewed as the causes for these crises. This essay will divide the foreign policies of both countries into: economic policies; political policies, social policies and military policies whilst also comparing the effects of these policies in terms of creating a crisis. 

To begin with, it can be argued that the differing political policies adopted by both sides was indeed a factor in itself which can be seen as a cause for the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Life in the East was dominated by the Communist Party. East Germany was the only communist single party state which had effectively been created from nothing and it became a representative model for which all communist states should follow. No other political parties were permitted and elections comprised of a number of candidates which had been selected by the Communist Party. The reason for Khrushchev wanting to exert a large amount of Soviet influence in Berlin was because of the pre-existing fear of another German invasion of Russia with there having already been one in 1914 and another in 1941. Though we must take into account that Khrushchev wanted the two German states to co-exist with each other similar to his desire for the acceptance of co-existence between the US and the USSR. To contrast, the Western political policy in both West Germany and West Berlin was indeed much more liberal and allowed for the flourishing of Germany, inevitably attracting East Germans to cross the de facto border between these two countries. However, both US and USSR political policies were similar in the sense that they both wished for German unity, but the Geneva Conference of 1959 and Camp David Summit highlighted a failure from both sides to agree on each other’s proposals. From this we can argue that the inability from both sides to accept each other’s political proposals and thus political ideologies in fact contributed greatly to the eventual construction of the Wall. It can be seen that in Cuba, the political policies undertaken by both sides were indeed largely focussed on being effective in the short term. Politically, the Soviet’s influence in Cuba was to essentially worry the US that there was now a communist state 120km away from American soil. It can be perceived that the political policy of the USSR was a protectionist policy in the sense that the adoption of Cuba into the Soviet sphere of influence was more because the Soviets wanted to deter the threat of a US attack; stabilising missiles within Cuba was simply a way in allowing this. Contrarily, the political policy adopted by the US was highly defensive as well as an example of its policy of containment. The need for a defensive policy was strengthened by Castro’s coup in 1959 and his announcement that he had shifted from an anti-US Cuban nationalist to a communist. If we are to compare the political policies of both these crises it can be viewed that though it eventually failed, politically the US and the USSR were much more willing to compromise over Germany as opposed to the crisis in Cuba which highlighted that these two sides were indeed polar opposites. The political policies in both crises can also be seen as the foundations for the social policies adopted by these countries.

 

The social policies of the USSR in East Berlin and East Germany were very restrictive and worked to repress the ordinary Berliner. Though the eastern region of Germany claimed to be democratic, it was in fact far from it. In comparison to the treatment of western Germans, the Soviet system in East Germany was very much oppressive and the USSR social policy in Berlin can thus also be viewed as this. The newspaper, radio and television were all controlled and the secret police, the Staatssicherheit, was responsible for both political surveillance and espionage. To contrast, the social policies imposed on West Berlin by the US, Britain and France were much more liberal likewise to their political policies. It became readily apparent that life in West Berlin brought more prosperity, with average wages being much higher than in the east as well as there being no secret police and no censorship. The completely contrasting social policies adopted by both sides in Berlin can be seen as a cause for the crisis. The migration of defectors from West Berlin to East Berlin created a “brain drain” (a loss of highly educated people) for the USSR’s East Berlin with there being over 10,000 defectors per week by 1961, significantly increasing tensions between the two sides. If anything, the varied growth of both East and West Berlin and the social prosperity of West Berlin only added to there being a crisis in Berlin as Khrushchev was led to believe that the only feasible way to deal with the inferiority of the East in relation to the West was to physically cut off both sides from each other with a wall. In Cuba, it can be argued that the social policies from both sides were perhaps not as distinguishable as the social policies in Berlin. However, the USSR’s social policy if anything was one that was very friendly to the Cuban populace with Khrushchev threatening in July 1960 to send Soviet troops to Cuba to defend the island if the US dared invade it. This amicable social stance taken by the USSR was mostly because of the USSR’s recognition of the importance of having a communist state in the Western Hemisphere. Whereas, the US social policy was much more offensive and threatening. Evidence of this can be seen in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, April 1961 in which Kennedy sent a force of around 1400 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs with the hope that this would trigger a popular uprising against Fidel Castro. Comparing the social policies adopted by both sides in each of the crises, we can acetate that it was not so much the social policies themselves that caused a crisis to happen but it was actually the conflict between these two differing social policies adopted by the US and the USSR which exacerbated the climate for a crisis to occur.

 

Moreover, it can be suggested that the economic policies of both the US and the USSR were in fact similar to the social policies imposed on both western and eastern Berlin as well as these policies stemming from very contrasting politically ideological perspectives. The USSR, though it claimed that it allowed for democratic freedom within both East Berlin and East Germany, actually repressed the East German economy (including East Berlin). In East Berlin, consumer goods were limited and often of poor quality. Sales of foreign goods were restricted and currency sales were strictly controlled in an effort to obtain foreign exchange. Essentially Khrushchev wanted to modernise the East German economy but under very strict supervision. Whereas the economy in West Berlin and indeed West Germany was flourishing at a much faster rate to its eastern competitor and promised a much more satisfying life for its citizens which can be seen that in the first 7 months of 1961, 207,00 defectors had left East Germany to settle in the west. From this we can infer that these two juxtaposing economies were a direct cause for the crisis of 1961. It became clear that the economic policies of the US, Britain and France were far superior and much more preferable to the German populace than the repressive economic stance taken by the USSR. It can be argued that the economic policies of both sides was the main cause for the construction of the Berlin Wall as it was built to block the loss of intellectuals from the East which if anything was caused by the differing economic policies. In Cuba it is perhaps sensible to assume that a strategic economic policy in Cuba was not a priority and that the US and USSR channelled a lot more effort into their military and political policies instead. However, the US’ imposition of an embargo on Cuba in 1962 crippled the Cuban economy greatly and demonstrated a dramatic souring of strong US-Cuban relations which had existed prior to the Cuban revolution. President Eisenhower declined Castro’s plea for aid and cut imports from Cuba by 95%. To contrast, the economic policy of the USSR in Cuba thrived off the deterioration of relations between the US and Cuba. In 1960, the Soviet Union signed an agreement to buy 1,000,000 tonnes of sugar per year for the next 5 years, tying the two countries together and resulting in there being a Communist country in the western sphere of influence. By viewing the economic policies taken by the US and the USSR it is clear that they both stem from differing political motives. The US antagonised Cuba because of their domination of the country pre-revolution which clearly resulted in a much more restrictive economic policy, whereas the USSR was keen to spread communism to the West and thus cemented relations with Cuba by supporting the economy generously through its agreement on its expenditure on grain. I would argue that the economic policies in Cuba were a minor cause for the Cuban Missile Crisis though nonetheless they did act as an early catalyst for the events which would follow shortly after in Cuba. Comparing the economic policies in both crises, it is apparent that the US/USSR influence on the German economies had a much more direct impact on Berlin and the whole of Germany and was an important cause for the crisis in 1961. But in Cuba, the economic policies were enforced at an early stage and though they exacerbated tensions between the US and the USSR, they had more of an indirect impact on the crisis as they provided the foundations for the non-confrontational military conflict between the two sides which followed.

 

Lastly, it is necessary to cover the military policy chosen by both sides and to assess whether this can be regarded as a factor which caused a crisis. In truth, the military policy from the two sides was far-fetched and less important than the socioeconomic and political policies. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff made refining contingency plans for various military probes of the railway to Berlin and they were prepared to implement a blockade similar to Stalin’s blockade in 1948-49. There was also an understanding that the Allies lacked military strength so the US and NATO were advised to build up their military power. On the other hand, Khrushchev largely exaggerated the military capability of the USSR with the hope that this would force the Allies to withdraw from West Berlin, recognise the legal existence of the USSR and recognise the GDR’s right to control Berlin’s borders. Comparing these military policies one can argue that they simply cannot be seen as a cause for the Berlin Crisis of 1961 as they were never put into effect. They were merely extended precautions for the potentiality of a conflict between the two sides. The US initially adopted an offensive military policy in Cuba which soon transformed itself into a defensive policy. This can be seen in the Bay of Pigs Fiasco when the CIA trained 1,500 exiles to overthrow Castro in 1959. However, the military policy of the US in Cuba post 1959 was arguably more defensive in the sense that 180 ships, a fleet of submarines and 156 ICBM’s were deployed as a defence mechanism against the serious possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack. The USSR however were always warningly offensive immediately before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis with the Soviet deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles defended by 40,000 Soviet troops, anti-aircraft batteries, short-range battlefield rockets and MIG-21 fighter planes. From this we can infer that the military policy posed by the Soviets was with the intention of escalating tensions so dangerously that the world was on the cusp of nuclear war if the US were to make a mistake which further pushed the buttons of the USSR. The US military policy, specifically during the crisis, was merely retaliatory, as naturally, the US recognised a need to defend itself at all costs. Therefore we can make the assumption that the military policies taken by both sides were in fact factors which caused the Cuban Missile Crisis but I would argue that the US should be seen as the scapegoat because they had previously deployed nuclear weaponry in Turkey and Italy prior to the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba. If we are to compare the military policies between these two crises it is obvious that what differs between these crises is that in Cuba there was a clear motivation that if worst came to worst, a military/nuclear conflict was inevitable, so we can argue from the perspective that there was certainly more of a need for a strict military policy in Cuba as opposed to in Berlin where the possibility of a nuclear war had not yet become real enough.

 

To conclude, I have argued my case that the policies adopted from both the US and the USSR in each of the crises can be seen as the causes for the crises themselves. In Berlin it would seem that the socioeconomic and political policies were the main causes for the crisis in 1961 but I would argue that the political policies taken from both sides is what allows these other policies to also contribute to the causation of the crisis. The differing ideologies immediately separated the two sides which ultimately allowed for a conflict in interests in how to deal with Germany, despite various attempts to reach an agreement to re-unite Germany. Similar to Berlin, the policies undertaken during the Cuban Missile Crisis are all linked to the contrasting capitalist/communist political ideologies and the innate fear of what each side was capable of. I personally perceive the military policy as the main cause for the crisis largely due to the deployment of nuclear weaponry being an indication that nuclear war was almost unavoidable. Comparing the two crises to each other, interestingly I would argue that the Cuban Missile Crisis might not have occurred had it not been for the Berlin Crisis the year before. My reasoning behind this is that the Berlin Crisis highlighted that the capitalist modus viventi seemed to be much more popular than the communist way of life. Because of this, Khrushchev undoubtedly felt deeply threatened by the West and the only way to suppress the domination of the US and to gain popular support was to create a hole in its Western sphere through the establishment of a communist state that was co-ordinated by COMINFORM. The title is suggestive that the policies, the causes of and the crises themselves were all separate to each other but I would argue the opposite and that each of these factors support each other. Finally, I believe that it is unfair for the policies adopted by the US and the USSR in Berlin and Cuba to be compared to each other as the Berlin Crisis can be viewed as a national crisis which involved the US and the USSR, whereas Cuba was arguably a global crisis which was applicable to the world.

Was Russia on the brink of revolution by 1914?

The 1905 October Manifesto brought significant change to the political culture of Russia. If the events of 1905 cannot be labelled as a revolution, they still contributed greatly to the most important and far-reaching change that Russia had experienced in its political history. For the first time, the Tsar did not have absolute power over the political system of Russia and the creation of the duma only encouraged the belief that Russia was now being governed by a constitutional monarchy as opposed to an absolute one. In the short-term, the constitutional reforms issued by the Tsar brought about a period of dramatic economic and social recovery, only strengthening the argument that Russia was embarking on a path of evolution into a great European power and weakening the perception that the only solution to Russia’s turmoil was a revolution. There are two ways to answering the aforementioned question. An optimist historian will argue that from 1905 onwards, Russia was undergoing a gradual evolution into a more modernised and advanced state driven by its industrial and social success, Stolypin’s agrarian reforms and the achievements of the duma. However, a pessimist will argue that Russia was drawing continuously closer to a revolution. The dangerous rise of workers’ protests, the lack of improvement on the living conditions of the peasantry and the persecution of minority groups heavily support this claim that by 1914 Russia was indeed tip-toeing on the fine line that separated itself from a revolution. Both of these conflicting views will be discussed throughout the essay and where necessary, the arguments proposed by distinguished historians will also be incorporated to strengthen these views. Also, though Russia never actually submitted itself to a revolution by 1914, I will assess whether the conditions that had been created through economic, social and political factors dating back to the 1905 October Manifesto were enough to certify the belief that Russia was on the verge of a revolution had it not been for the outbreak of the war in 1914 which, arguably had the effect of either transforming the situation in Russia or being the catalyst needed to bring about revolution in 1917.

 

To begin with, an optimist will view the social and industrial improvement of Russia as an evolutionary step for its modernisation and if anything, a deterrent to the idea of a revolution by 1914. In the years following 1905, Russia had asserted itself as the fifth greatest industrial power with its rate of industrial growth between 1908-1913 at an impressive 8% and its coal and steel production rising by nearly 50%. Coupled with this, the Third Duma increased government spending on elementary schools from 1.8% of the budget to 4.2% and the period following 1905 saw a 77% growth in the number of pupils as well as the literacy rate increasing by 15% by 1914. From the view of the optimists these enormous developments are substantial evidence that Russia had indeed vastly modernised itself industrially with the improvement of its social standards running parallel to this. One might argue that Russia was nowhere near the brink of a revolution by 1914 with its industrial and social improvements supporting the idea that it was only evolving into a more constitutional and socially-accepted state. Gigantism had a massive impact on industrial success with factories that held more than 1000 workers showing a 10% increase in its number of workers. My point is, industrialisation brought employment, satisfying the bulk of the Russian populace and thus steering them away from any revolutionary intent. This if anything is enough to assume that Russia was by no means near a revolution by 1914. It is correct to recognise that progress was slow, but positive change was occurring to the satisfaction of the Russian people, a lot of progress had actually been made since 1905, enough to greatly dishearten a desire for revolution. However, from the perspective of the pessimists, Russia’s social and industrial changes were simply enforced too late and that these modernisations only highlighted a clear division between the classes. Despite the improvements made, the number of industrial workers grew to over 3 million and conditions were not improved alongside this staggering growth. In 1914 there was still only a small number of Russian children who attended school and the educational curriculum for these schools was simply too basic. Russia’s backwardness in education can be seen as detrimental as it highlighted that there was no real effort being made to promote the teaching of the youth population, encouraging the idea that the government was afraid that a new and educated youth would encourage criticism of the autocracy. There was also very small numbers of doctors and teachers in the rural areas, revealing the massive social gap between the educated and the peasantry. One might argue that this provided a solid foundation for a revolution as it seemed that the social reforms of Russia were actually failing to keep up with the vast industrial reforms which were occurring at the same time. This only left the overwhelming majority of Russia (the peasantry) dissatisfied, as both their working and living conditions had been given very little acknowledgement and they were actually failing to benefit from these changes at all. It is reasonable to perceive that Russia was modernising itself on a larger scale rather than focussing on improving conditions for the individual. The ignorance of the peasantry understandably stirred hatred among the masses amplifying the conditions for revolution.  Gigantism can be seen as only contributing to the spread of revolutionary ideas in trade unions allowing the peasantry to unite in one justified cause to work to bring down the autocracy. Protests such as the 1912 Lena Goldifelds Massacre emphasise that Russia was indeed on the brink of revolution by 1914 as the peasants’ hatred of the autocracy was actually so widespread that it was simply too difficult to manage the rebelliousness of the bulk of the Russian people.

 

Furthermore, historian Michael Florinsky argues that the constitutional changes brought to Russia improved the democratic rights of the Russian people, commentating that “the door to these [democratic] changes was now open“. Indeed membership in the duma of political parties and trade unions was allowed after 1906 and serfs were given the right to vote in national elections. Tsar Nicholas II did not have the authority to dispense with elected Dumas, despite having made confrontations with the first two. The Third Duma also played a very constructive role in promoting educational expansion and improving on Stolypin’s agrarian reforms. The creation of a duma in itself can be seen as a massive political breakthrough for Russia as it was the ultimate sign that the power of the Tsar was reducing and that the democratic rights of peasants were being increased, thus supporting Florinsky’s view. Florinsky would argue that Russia was nowhere near the brink of revolution by 1914 as it was slowly evolving towards a system of parliamentary democracy, even if the Tsar himself disagreed with the transformation of the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy. Conversely, Richard Charques adopts a more pessimistic view of the constitutional reforms and believes that they only catalyse Russia to the brink of revolution by 1914. His claim is that Russia had transformed itself into a “demi-semi constitutional monarchy“, essentially implying that the constitutional changes made were exploited by the interference of the autocracy. Nicholas II had only laid out the October Manifesto to save the monarchy and his 1906 Fundamental Laws made it clear that “Supreme Autocratic Power belongs to the emperor” and that “no law can come into his force without his approval.“. Charques argues that though the duma was created and there were constitutional reforms, democracy was in fact severely limited so that the autocracy would still have a large influence on the politics of the country. This is supported by the fact that the duma was bicameral which allowed the upper class to dominate the political scene. Also, 600 trades unions were shut down by 1911 and both the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries had their applications for registration turned down. If anything, democracy had been severely reduced and the duma can be seen as a tool to camouflage the interference of the autocracy. Such democratic repression surely escalated tensions between the autocracy and the Russian people and only encouraged reformists to become revolutionaries due to the repression of their political freedom. From a pessimistic view, Nicholas II was losing the confidence of the nation and was leading Russia into, according to Guchkov, leader of the Octobrist Party, an “inevitable and grave catastrophe” i.e. revolution.

   

The Duma

 

 Moreover, Peter Stolypin’s agrarian reforms can be seen as a success that helped transform Russia for the greater good. His “wager on the strong” reforms aimed at the break-up of the commune and its replacement by a new class of prosperous peasants who would both promote economic modernisation and ensure social stability. Prior to 1914, there had been an initial rush to register lands in individual ownership and it has been calculated that around half the peasant households in the Empire had private ownership. Stolypin’s reforms arguably managed to stamp out the idea of revolution among the peasantry. Indeed Lenin saw the reforms as a threat to his plan of enthusing the peasants’ protests into a workers’ revolution so we might view Stolypin’s reforms as a barrier to revolution as it drove peasants away from a revolutionary path and kept them as reactionary. We can view his reforms as a painful but hopeful beginning. Though Stolypin’s reforms achieved success in the southern regions and not the entirety of Russia, we must recognise that by 1914, 25% of peasants had left the communes and 10% had consolidated their holdings. Stolypin’s reforms  can be seen as controversial as they offered perhaps too much freedom to the peasantry, but the figures support the assumption that they actually worked in satisfying the peasantry whilst also satisfying the government as the need for political concessions was reduced. The reforms actually eroded the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and therefore it is fair to assume that preceding the First World War, Stolypin’s reforms did not provide the climate for a revolution in 1914 and thus we might have to rely on the war itself as being the game-changer that transformed the conditions of Russia, giving it more reason for a revolution. On the other hand,  historian Martin McCauley suggests that Stolypin’s reforms were “likely to have only moderate success in Russia in the short term“. He adds that Stolypin’s predictions that his reforms would take twenty years to operate effectively were simply not good enough as the reforms required fast growth in the rest of the economy to siphon off surplus rural labour as well as changed attitudes and a higher cultural level among the peasantry. It is thus justifiable to argue that his attempts at solving the agrarian issue were launched too late to have the effect he expected. With more than 80% of the Russian population dependant on the land, there were simply too many peasants trying to earn a living from farming. This allowed for the peasantry to feel much of the hardships that came with the modernisation of Russia, encouraging resentment towards the autocracy and thus undermining the agrarian reforms issued by Stolypin. Stolypin’s assassination  in 1911 is enough in itself to support the perception that by 1914, Russia was indeed on the brink of a revolution. Though his reforms were the first serious attempt to tackle peasant backwardness and overpopulation in the rural areas. The flaw to Stolypin’s reforms was time, and they failed to solve the agrarian issue at all in the short term only adding to the peasants’ anger and strengthening the argument that by 1914 the climate of Russia was indeed in a state in which revolution was imminent, with the First World War simply delaying its happening.

 

Having already assessed the industrial and social climate of Russia prior to 1914, it is important to analyse the treatment of industrial workers and minority groups and whether this adds to the reasoning that by 1914 Russia was on the brink of a revolution. The government, sensing the very high threat posed by revolutionary parties, sought to diminish their social standing in Russia. The Social Democratic Party was reduced from 150,000 in 1906 to 10,000. As well as this, the leaders of revolutionary groups were exiled and members of these groups were harassed by the police. The government campaign to dissolve these revolutionary groups effectively worked  and as a result, the groups were having sufficient difficulty in spreading revolutionary ideas. We can argue that Russia simply was not on the verge of revolution purely because revolutionary groups were weak and scattered due to governmental interference; they could hardly act with effectiveness and thus posed only a minor threat to the tsarist regime. Moreover, it can be argued that Russian nationalism effectively deterred the need for revolution as it brought the nation together. The 1906 Fundamental Laws promoted Russification stating that Russians should be “one and indivisible” implying that they should unite with the common aim to essentially russify the non-Russian populace. This if anything deflected social and industrial tensions and reduced the threat of a revolution as Russians were encouraged to blame the Jewish community for Russia’s social issues with the Anti-Semitic group the “Black Hundreds” organising the deaths of thousands of Jews in 1906. Revolution was thus perhaps unthinkable by 1914 as the strategy to nationalise the Russian people actually increased unity between them and diverted attention away from revolution and placed the blame for the upset the Russian people felt on the ethnic minority groups. Conversely, one might argue that the persecution of non-Russian groups encouraged antagonism which in turn led these minority groups to support and to join the revolutionary groups. The Tsar seems to have been unaware of the fact that the progress of modernisation and industrialisation were failing to solve the growing resentment the peasants had for the regime. The refusal to allow minority groups a federal state and the need to convert these groups to the Russian way of life only planted the seeds for radical, revolutionary beliefs to spread through the peasantry, indeed strengthening the claim that by 1914, revolution was almost certain to happen, it was only a matter of when it would. Added to this, the number of strikes over poor living conditions for the peasantry had increased from 2,000 in 1912 to over 3,000 by 1914 supporting the idea that the majority of the Russian population faced an ever-growing hostility towards the autocracy. Revolution was highly expected by 1914 due to a combination of detestation from various groups for the current autocracy. The combination of the Jewish groups, national minority groups and the workers themselves only solidifies the assumption that a revolution was impossible to prevent by 1914 given the sheer amount of opposition to the current autocratic system.

 

Finally, having discussed the ways in which the government dealt with non-Russians and revolutionaries in general, it is vital to analyse the actual strength of the revolutionary groups in more depth in order to consider how much of a threat they posed to the existing government with their revolutionary intentions. The optimists would argue that though they existed and did have some influence on the Duma, these revolutionary groups did not sufficiently heighten the probability of there being a revolution by 1914. Prominent revolutionary groups such as the SR’s and Mensheviks had been significantly weakened pre-1914 with there being divisions amongst the leadership of the party and between the leadership and the rank and file. This suggests that revolutionary groups did not actually contribute greatly to the building up of revolutionary tension. The lack of leadership and the poor organisation only numbed any worries that these groups could have a strong influence on the Russian population. Added to this, the Social Democrats occupied the least number of seats in the Duma after the Trudoviks, allowing the reactionaries to dominate the assemblies and to prevent the SD party from having much of an effect. If anything, one might argue that Russia was not even close to revolution by 1914 because the opposing parties were so weak, allowing themselves to be controlled by the autocracy and suppressed by the overwhelming majority of Octobrists in the Duma. Double agents such as Evno Azef and Roman Malinovsky were employed by the Okhrana to exploit the revolutionary groups in which they did, transmitting key information back to the police. Revolution was simply defused by the sheer lengths at which the government went to suppress the anti-government groups thus hardly creating the conditions for a revolution by 1914. However, from the perspective of the pessimists, these revolutionary groups increased social tensions so much to the point that by 1914 a revolution was in fact very believable. Revolutionary agitation had only increased since the Lena Goldfields Massacre of 1912 and by 1914, the Bolsheviks had gained control of some of the biggest unions in St Petersburg and Moscow such as the Metalworkers Union. The Bolshevik paper, Pravda, had achieved a national circulation of 40,000 copies per issue, followed by the Menshevik paper which had managed 20,000. From this we can infer  that the threat of revolution was always overhanging in Russia and that the strength of these revolutionary groups should not be undermined as they clearly were able to produce a vast number of copies that would spread revolutionary belief throughout the whole of Russia. Though the government was able to target and diminish the stance of these revolutionary groups, their existence as well as the fact that they were seen as a highly dangerous threat is enough to assume that the government would not be able to control these revolutionary groups in the long term. So we can suggest that these revolutionary groups support the claim that by 1914 Russia was on the brink of revolution, but it is important to regard the First World War as the catalyst to allowing these revolutionary groups to gain more and more power up until 1917.

 

To conclude,  in order to establish whether I side with the belief that Russia was on the brink of revolution by 1914, it is important to register how the First World War should be seen. The First World War was a catalyst for revolution in 1917. Because of this assumption it is thus right to assume that Russia was indeed on the brink of a revolution by 1914. Having tackled the various  arguments taken from both sides over the social, economic and political policies it would seem that revolution was in fact inevitable, regardless of the time in which it would take place. The combination of the workers’ protests, the short-term failure of Stolypin’s reforms and the severe limitation of democracy within the Duma all significantly heightened tensions between the autocracy and the rest of Russian society. The situation was simply out of the Tsar’s hands because if he offered more freedom to the rest of the Russian population it would only encourage  the spread of radical, revolutionary beliefs and if he chose to repress the populace then he would lose the support of the masses and increase antagonism and hatred for the autocracy, a different route which would still lead to the same destination which is the  inevitability of revolution. This suggests that the reason for why the conditions for revolution had been put into effect by 1914 was not so much because of the failures of the autocracy but more because of the growing agitation that was spreading among the rest of Russia. We can therefore identify that the modernisation of Russia as a whole actually had more of a detrimental effect on the country as it was apparent that the flourishing of the individual could not run parallel to the flourishing of the state. Russia was more concerned with itself as a nation and its ignorance towards its people is the ultimate reason as to why by 1914 Russia had found itself on the brink of a revolution.

Girolamo Savonarola

  Girolamo Savonarola, was born in Ferrara, Italy, September 21st 1452. Initially, his family were rather well-off with his grandfather Michele Savonarola being an esteemed Professor of Medicine at the University of Padua as well as being a court physician. Though post the death of Michele, Girolamo’s father failed to sustain the financial comfortability that had supported the Savonarola household through Michele’s wealth. Girolamo was the third of seven children and from an early age it became readily apparent that he was a keen intellectual, supposedly driven by the success of his grandfather. During his adolescence he developed an interest in classics (most notably Latin) and studied the works of countless Latin scholars. Some historians believe that Savonarola’s radical front on Christianity stems from the religious views of his grandfather who also publicly detested the ways in which Christianity was being imposed in Florence.

Interestingly, though the later Savonarola would pursue a path of religion/politics, he chose to study medicine at university following in the footsteps of his grandfather. Alongside this he studied the liberal arts. Though he failed to develop a core interest in these fields and made the decision to shift towards his real interest which was religion itself. It is important to note that Florence at this time was being governed by the de facto leadership of the House of Medici. Savonarola was horrified by Medici rule. The rise of the Medici saw the revival, the Renaissance of Ancient Greek and Roman cultures, though alongside this, this brought change to the traditional Catholic Church. He believed the clergy had dramatically shifted away from basic Christian morals and had allowed bribery and patronage from the Medici to dominate the Church and co-ordinate its actions. 

Fuelled by his new drive to studying Christianity, he left the house of his father April 24th, 1475 and set out to Bologna and joined the Dominician Order, becoming a friar. He would send letters to his father explaining his departure. The latter of his letters were in fact rather brutal and explained his aims.

“The Prince of princes, he who is infinite power, calls me with a loud voice – more, he begs me (oh vast love) with a thousand tears (as on the Cross) to gird on a sword of the finest gold and precious stones, because he wants me in the ranks of his militant Knights” – an extract from Lauro Martines’ “Scourge and Fire Savonarola and Renaissance Italy”

From this we can identify that Savonarola felt directly summoned by God. He valued himself as a prophet, a knight of Christ and believed he has a sense of fulfilment to reform the Catholic Church and to allow it to retrogress back to its traditional, fundamentalist ways. He was against art, music, humour, sex, the present clergy at the time. His very opposite views allowed for people to view him as a heretic.

In 1482, the Dominican friar was sent to San Marco, Florence to preach sermons to the local populace. However, he was rather unsuccessful with his sermons in which he preached about the apocalypse. However, in the late 1480s, his profile grew in San Gimignano. He put forward that the Catholic Church needed heavy reform in order for it to maintain its overruling power. In doing so, he concluded that the church would need to be scourged followed by a renewal of its system.

Alongside this, Savonarola became seen as the primary opposer to the Medici rule and would preach about the failures and corruption of the Medici oligarchy. He viewed the government of Lorenzo the Magnificent, the so-called “Father of the Italian Renaissance” as a benevolent tyranny who only promoted  the exploitation of the Church. He was actually surprisingly sent back to Florence by Lorenzo, a massive error on his part as it only allowed the Dominican friar to extend his criticism of the Medici rule to within Florence itself in the early 1490s. As a way of suppressing Savonarola’s dangerous criticisms Lorenzo tried and failed at bribing the friar to discontinue with his actions. Though this is altogether a rather stupid action given that Savonarola himself had always been wholeheartedly against what Lorenzo was actually trying to give him. What is also rather odd is that Lorenzo, at his deathbed, called Savonarola of all Christian priests to ask for absolution. Legend has it that Savonarola actually refused to give Lorenzo de’ Medici absolution but it has been identified that he most likely did in fact grant him his blessing. Savonarola had actually predicted Lorenzo’s death years before.

1494 saw the invasion of Italy by King Charles VIII of France. Piero de’ Medici, the successor to Lorenzo the Magnificent faced hatred from the Florentine populace as he succumbed to the French King and handed over seven key fortresses. This resulted in the expulsion of the Medici family and an 18 year drought of Medici rule in Florence. Savonarola viewed King Charles as a godsend and as the man sent from God to be the scourger of Florence. The fleeing of the Medici and the departure of King Charles was the catalyst for Savonarola’s rule over Florence

He set up a democratic government based on his ideals of a city that owed its allegiance to God Himself. He imposed a system that revolved over his ideal of Christianity. He proceeded with his sermons and alongside this he set up his own police force which would monitor the streets of Florence and aid the maintenance of a city which flourished on Savonarola’s strict view on morality. Though alongside this, Savonarola faced opposition. Pope Alexander VI was opposed to Savonarola’s rule. In fact Savonarola, though he respected the papacy, viewed the Pope as a key example of how corrupt the Church had become. The Pope was by no means the greatest or most ideal religious figure. He himself had several children, already opposing the beliefs of Savonarola that people should remain sexually pure to maintain their bodies as temples of the Holy Spirit. He also faced opposition from a group known as the Arrabiati who were in league with the Pope and the Duke of Milan. This created a powerful political opposition to Savonarola’s rule of Florence. 

In fact, the Pope summoned Savonarola to preach to him his sermons but Savonarola declined stating that he was simply ill. February 7th 1497 Savonarola called for a “Bonfire of the Vanities” in which citizens of Florence threw objects that would tempt them to sin into a great fire. Jewellery, clothes, mirrors were all burned. It is even considered that the artist Boticelli through his own works into the fire as to redeem himself from his sons. The Pope banned Savonarola from preaching and May 12th, 1947 the Pope excommunicated Savonarola.

Savonarola regained his influence in Florence but soon faced opposition from Fra Domenico da Pescia, a Franciscan who challenged Savonarola to ordeal by fire. This ordeal by fire was a way of proving the supernatural capabilities claimed by both Fras. This was heavily encouraged by the citizens of Florence, however much to their anger the ordeal never took place due to the ill-arrival of the Franciscan Fra. Because no supernatural proof was presented, both Fras were tortured until pleading guilty to lying that they could perform supernatural powers. Savanorala was accused of heresy at an ecclesiastical trial and was to be put to death by hanging along with Fra Domenico and Fra Silvestro. He was burnt during his execution and was hurled with insults throughout with citizens shouting at him to save himself if he truly was a knight of Christ. This bears some resemblance to the crucifixion of Christ, though unfortunately Savonarola failed to deliver the wishes of the masses. He died May 23rd, 1498.

Tsar Alexander II

Tsar Alexander II of Russia succeeded his father Nicholas I in 1855. Russia’s European power had been gradually diminishing in the mid 19th century as it became apparent that it could not compete with the other countries of Europe.1848 saw revolutions with Piedmont-Sardinia trying to create a unified Italian state, the first steps to a new German state being taken and a revolution in Hungary. Russia was on the brink of defeat in the Crimean War and had been shamefully embarrassed by its military backwardness. Alexander II inherited an isolated nation that was dangerously weak. Alexander II shifted from a more conservative regime that had been adopted by his father, to a more liberal regime in which he sought to modernise Russia so that it could compete with industrialised Europe. Alexander II made a number of liberal reforms throughout his autocratic rule, most notably his emancipation of the serfs in 1861 alongside reforms of the judiciary system in which he introduced a more accusatorial system consisting of barristers, reforms of the local government in which he brought in elected assemblies called zemstva and dumy, reforms of the army based on the methods of Albrecht von Roon and reforms of the education system with expansionism of schools. His autocratic rule brought much change in Russia and saw a shift to modernity. Towards the end of his rule he faced considerable opposition from nihilists and populists which owed to his eventual assassination in 1881 by the narodnaya volya (The People’s Will) a political terrorist group.  

An evaluation of the roles of the policies of the United States in the origins of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949

The conclusion to the Second World War in 1945 sparked the onset of the Cold War between the West and the East as each side aimed to impose their competing and highly contrasting ideologies onto the rest of the world. Most notably this was a war between two superpowers: capitalist USA governed by President Truman (elected after the untimely death of Roosevelt April 12th, 1945) and communist USSR, governed by Joseph Stalin. The focus of this essay will be to evaluate the roles of US policies in the origins of the Cold War, that is immediately post-WW2, within the time-frame of 1945-49. It is perhaps necessary to clarify that a “role” of a policy assesses the reasoning behind the policy as well as its effects. I plan to tackle US policy by breaking it down into the following categories: policy of containment, open door policy, foreign economic policy and military policy. Accompanying these policies will be the key events of this period of the Cold War; the Truman Doctrine (1947), Marshall Aid (1947), the Berlin Blockade (1948-49) and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (April 4th, 1949) to name but a few. Coupled with this I will seek to explain how the USA’s policy of containment links to each of the aforementioned policies and why it is the principal and most important policy adopted by the US. I will also explain how these policies progressed through these first four years, from more US self-interest policies in the first 2 years, to more defensive policies in the latter two, and how they all contributed to a retrogression in relations between the US and the USSR as tensions heightened. But most importantly I will explain why US policies were a western success but an eastern failure. 

To begin with, the policy of containment was a commonsensical, nationally successful campaign adopted by the US between the years 1945-49, yet it only led to heavily distilling relations with the USSR. The role of the policy of containment was to essentially insulate the spread of communism in the world. Though the US were bitterly opposed to communism it is important to realise that containment did not mean the eradication of communism, but simply the prevention of its further spread. It is perhaps justifiable to assume that the basis for this policy stemmed from George Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram” in which he identified that the Soviet Union posed a fundamental threat to the American way of life and that the USA had a self-obligation to actively support other nations to contain the spread of communism. This fear of communism and the policy of containment was projected into the Truman Doctrine, 1947 which was created in response to the Greek government’s inability to ward off communist rebels in its civil war. The Doctrine allowed the US to prevent communist spread given that it was never officially directed at communism. The fear of the spread of communism and the need for containment was evident in Iran in 1945 when the USSR increased its number of troops in Iran going against their promises that they would remove their troops after 6 months. The US appealed to the UN Security Council and the USSR’s troops were removed. Another instance of fear of communist influence was in Turkey, August 1946, when it appeared that the Soviet Union wished to establish naval bases there and thus turn it into a satellite state. Alarmed by this, the US encouraged the Turks to resist the USSR and the US established naval bases there to deter communist influence. From this we can infer that the policy of containment was a turning point in the Cold War and highly successful for the US in the short term as it managed to prevent communist spread. However, this policy only crippled US relations with the USSR as containment made it clear that the US believed the capitalist way of life was far superior to the communist one.

 

Furthermore, the United States’ open door policy was a short term success but a long term failure. The role of the open door policy was to restructure the world economically so that American business could trade, operate, and profit without any restrictions. The leading example of the open door policy was Marshall Aid (1947) a project carried out by the US that put the ideas of the Truman Doctrine, that is to attempt to rebuild Europe (through grants of money) after the disaster of the Second World War, into effect. One could argue that Marshall Aid was indeed a success for the open-door policy given that the £13,750,000,000 of money handed over to Europe from the US allowed 17 European countries to recover much more quickly. However, the failures of the open-door policy outweigh its successes. The real reason for Marshall Aid and thus the open door policy, was to reduce communist influence in Europe. Marshall Aid would be controlled by the US’ Marshall Plan, other countries would not be able to decide for themselves how it would be carried out. In doing this Truman hoped that the US would be able to influence eastern Europe and undermine communism. But the Soviet Union pulled out of Marshall Aid along with its satellite states when they discovered they would have to join the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). The open-door policy was thus a short term success as it firmly strengthened US relations with Western Europe but a long term failure as it was another early confirmation that the US sought to exert capitalism onto Eastern Bloc countries as a way of containing or even extinguishing the influence of communism. The real role of the open-door policy was communist containment, therefore this policy can only be seen as a failure even more so because it intensified competition between the US and the USSR as it owed to the 1949 creation of COMECON, the Soviet equivalent to Marshall Aid.

 

Moreover, the foreign economic policy of the US acted as more of a retaliating defensive policy as opposed to an active policy that was driven by the self-interest of the US. The overriding role of the US foreign economic policy was to support their idea of western European integration, a process of creating a western Europe that was united politically, economically and militarily. The most notable example of the foreign economic policy of the US was the crisis in Berlin between 1948-49. The ultimate difference between the foreign economic policy of the west and the east was that the west wanted the German economy to rebuild itself whereas the east wanted to continue suppressing the German economy as the Soviet Union feared that Germany would stir up trouble within Europe again given they had already invaded the USSR twice before in 1914 and 1941. General Lucius Clay, governor of the US zone tried to force the Soviets to accept their economic policy in Germany by announcing in May 1946 that no further deliveries of reparation goods would be made to the Soviet Union. The US along with the other western powers introduced the German currency the Deutschmark in western Germany dividing the economic growth within Germany. After the 1946 Conference of Foreign Ministers it was decided that the US and British zones would merge to form Bizonia and the French zone was later added in January 1947, The alliance of these zones brought economic prosperity to Western Germany and allowed for it to rebuild itself much quicker. Stalin responded with a blockade aimed to suppress western Germany but was unsuccessful and called it off 12th May 1949. The US foreign economic policy was thus an eventual success given that it completely achieved its role which was the idea of western European integration. Its foreign economic policy became more effective in the latter years of this four year period and demonstrates a shift away from US self-interest policies and a move towards western European liberalisation and defence from the threat of Sovietization. Though one can again argue that this is another instance of the policy of containment, and one that was successful given that the west managed to repel communist infection. However, the consequence of the United States’ early foreign economic policy was that it amplified the mistrust between the US and the USSR and persuaded the USSR to focus on communist domination in Asia.

 

Lastly, the US military policy was a national success in both 1945 and 1949 but a failure with unprecedented consequences in regards to the response of Eastern Europe. The role of the US military policy was essentially to build up a strong defence mechanism against the communist east. There are two prime examples between the years 1945-1949 that highlight the USA’s military policy. The first example of the US military policy was the US 1945 creation of the atomic bombs Fat Man and Little Boy which they detonated on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War. The second example is the 1949 military alliance known as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which stressed that it “will take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic area.” Both of these examples show that the focus of the US military policy was to protect the west from the East. It is right to believe that these instances were indeed a national success because the US became the first country to possess nuclear weaponry giving the world further reason to implore peace so as to avert itself from Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). NATO was a national success as well as a western one as it strengthened the defensive alliance of the west from the fear of a communist attack. The 1945 creation of the atomic bomb demonstrated dramatic progression for the US military policy but there was relative stasis in terms of US military policy up until the creation of NATO in 1949 which was a turning point for the Cold War, as it was a military division between East and West. The military policy of the US was thus a success in terms of fulfilling its role but the effects of this defensive policy highlight its failure in the long term. It was yet another policy that contributed to the breakdown of relations to the east. It was another camouflaged containment policy which had the intention at heart of fighting off communism. The military policy of the United States only drove the USSR to research into nuclear development with the eventual creation of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 and also to push for an eastern military alliance that was the Warsaw Pact of 1955.

 

To conclude, the policies of the United States usually seemed to be successful in achieving the basic roles they were given and maintaining a strong hold on western Europe. However they were generally very unsuccessful in stabilising and thawing relations with Eastern Europe. It is thus very justifiable to believe that the US was in fact the scapegoat for the Cold War as its policies only provoked an understandable response from the east in the forms of the Soviet atomic bomb, COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. The actions of the US showed a retrogression in US-USSR relations as it amplified the prejudice of communism that was previously seen in 1920s America with the Red Scare. It seems that their military policy begins the 1945-49 period and ends it as it was the flame that sparked the Cold War with their creation of the atomic bomb and by 1949 the US military policy soon became the fire that ignited the standoff between the US and the USSR with NATO being a clear division between the East and West, shortly followed by the formal division of Germany. It is also noticeable that the US progressed into more defensive policies in the latter half of this four year period with their resistance to Stalin’s blockade in Berlin. Though what links all these policies together and what is in fact fundamental to each of them is Truman’s policy of containment. Each of these policies were a camouflage for the ultimate policy of the US which was containment. The policy of containment was a successful policy for the US and western Europe as they managed to fight off and prevent the spread of parasitic communism. Despite certain failures in these separate policies, the success of containment between 1945-49 is the overruling factor which decides that the role of US policy was overall successful in the bigger picture.