Compare and contrast the causes of, and the policies of the USA and the USSR during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

Photograph taken by a U-2 Spy Plane of Missile bases on Cuba

The aftermath of the Berlin Blockade demonstrated a clear ideological division between the US and the USSR as the West wished to rebuild the Germany economy in contrast to the USSR which wanted to continue with the repression of Germany in order to stamp out the potential threat a powerful Germany might pose. This led to the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic which only exacerbated tensions between the West and the East as these two countries became a physical division between capitalist and communist states. The partition of Germany indefinitely worsened problems in the long term as competing US and USSR foreign policies ultimately led to the construction of the Berlin Wall at 2:00 A.M. August 13th, 1961. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year revealed a further deterioration in relations between the US and the USSR with the USSR adopting a warningly offensive policy in contrast to the US which had no choice but to adopt a defensive policy in order to suppress the potentiality of a nuclear attack. Also, unlike the crisis of Berlin, a hardline military policy was taken by both sides which arguably had the result of bringing these two superpowers to the very brink of nuclear war. It is important to register that in order to answer this question, we must take into account that the policies of both countries can also be viewed as the causes for these crises. This essay will divide the foreign policies of both countries into: economic policies; political policies, social policies and military policies whilst also comparing the effects of these policies in terms of creating a crisis. 

To begin with, it can be argued that the differing political policies adopted by both sides was indeed a factor in itself which can be seen as a cause for the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Life in the East was dominated by the Communist Party. East Germany was the only communist single party state which had effectively been created from nothing and it became a representative model for which all communist states should follow. No other political parties were permitted and elections comprised of a number of candidates which had been selected by the Communist Party. The reason for Khrushchev wanting to exert a large amount of Soviet influence in Berlin was because of the pre-existing fear of another German invasion of Russia with there having already been one in 1914 and another in 1941. Though we must take into account that Khrushchev wanted the two German states to co-exist with each other similar to his desire for the acceptance of co-existence between the US and the USSR. To contrast, the Western political policy in both West Germany and West Berlin was indeed much more liberal and allowed for the flourishing of Germany, inevitably attracting East Germans to cross the de facto border between these two countries. However, both US and USSR political policies were similar in the sense that they both wished for German unity, but the Geneva Conference of 1959 and Camp David Summit highlighted a failure from both sides to agree on each other’s proposals. From this we can argue that the inability from both sides to accept each other’s political proposals and thus political ideologies in fact contributed greatly to the eventual construction of the Wall. It can be seen that in Cuba, the political policies undertaken by both sides were indeed largely focussed on being effective in the short term. Politically, the Soviet’s influence in Cuba was to essentially worry the US that there was now a communist state 120km away from American soil. It can be perceived that the political policy of the USSR was a protectionist policy in the sense that the adoption of Cuba into the Soviet sphere of influence was more because the Soviets wanted to deter the threat of a US attack; stabilising missiles within Cuba was simply a way in allowing this. Contrarily, the political policy adopted by the US was highly defensive as well as an example of its policy of containment. The need for a defensive policy was strengthened by Castro’s coup in 1959 and his announcement that he had shifted from an anti-US Cuban nationalist to a communist. If we are to compare the political policies of both these crises it can be viewed that though it eventually failed, politically the US and the USSR were much more willing to compromise over Germany as opposed to the crisis in Cuba which highlighted that these two sides were indeed polar opposites. The political policies in both crises can also be seen as the foundations for the social policies adopted by these countries.

 

The social policies of the USSR in East Berlin and East Germany were very restrictive and worked to repress the ordinary Berliner. Though the eastern region of Germany claimed to be democratic, it was in fact far from it. In comparison to the treatment of western Germans, the Soviet system in East Germany was very much oppressive and the USSR social policy in Berlin can thus also be viewed as this. The newspaper, radio and television were all controlled and the secret police, the Staatssicherheit, was responsible for both political surveillance and espionage. To contrast, the social policies imposed on West Berlin by the US, Britain and France were much more liberal likewise to their political policies. It became readily apparent that life in West Berlin brought more prosperity, with average wages being much higher than in the east as well as there being no secret police and no censorship. The completely contrasting social policies adopted by both sides in Berlin can be seen as a cause for the crisis. The migration of defectors from West Berlin to East Berlin created a “brain drain” (a loss of highly educated people) for the USSR’s East Berlin with there being over 10,000 defectors per week by 1961, significantly increasing tensions between the two sides. If anything, the varied growth of both East and West Berlin and the social prosperity of West Berlin only added to there being a crisis in Berlin as Khrushchev was led to believe that the only feasible way to deal with the inferiority of the East in relation to the West was to physically cut off both sides from each other with a wall. In Cuba, it can be argued that the social policies from both sides were perhaps not as distinguishable as the social policies in Berlin. However, the USSR’s social policy if anything was one that was very friendly to the Cuban populace with Khrushchev threatening in July 1960 to send Soviet troops to Cuba to defend the island if the US dared invade it. This amicable social stance taken by the USSR was mostly because of the USSR’s recognition of the importance of having a communist state in the Western Hemisphere. Whereas, the US social policy was much more offensive and threatening. Evidence of this can be seen in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, April 1961 in which Kennedy sent a force of around 1400 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs with the hope that this would trigger a popular uprising against Fidel Castro. Comparing the social policies adopted by both sides in each of the crises, we can acetate that it was not so much the social policies themselves that caused a crisis to happen but it was actually the conflict between these two differing social policies adopted by the US and the USSR which exacerbated the climate for a crisis to occur.

 

Moreover, it can be suggested that the economic policies of both the US and the USSR were in fact similar to the social policies imposed on both western and eastern Berlin as well as these policies stemming from very contrasting politically ideological perspectives. The USSR, though it claimed that it allowed for democratic freedom within both East Berlin and East Germany, actually repressed the East German economy (including East Berlin). In East Berlin, consumer goods were limited and often of poor quality. Sales of foreign goods were restricted and currency sales were strictly controlled in an effort to obtain foreign exchange. Essentially Khrushchev wanted to modernise the East German economy but under very strict supervision. Whereas the economy in West Berlin and indeed West Germany was flourishing at a much faster rate to its eastern competitor and promised a much more satisfying life for its citizens which can be seen that in the first 7 months of 1961, 207,00 defectors had left East Germany to settle in the west. From this we can infer that these two juxtaposing economies were a direct cause for the crisis of 1961. It became clear that the economic policies of the US, Britain and France were far superior and much more preferable to the German populace than the repressive economic stance taken by the USSR. It can be argued that the economic policies of both sides was the main cause for the construction of the Berlin Wall as it was built to block the loss of intellectuals from the East which if anything was caused by the differing economic policies. In Cuba it is perhaps sensible to assume that a strategic economic policy in Cuba was not a priority and that the US and USSR channelled a lot more effort into their military and political policies instead. However, the US’ imposition of an embargo on Cuba in 1962 crippled the Cuban economy greatly and demonstrated a dramatic souring of strong US-Cuban relations which had existed prior to the Cuban revolution. President Eisenhower declined Castro’s plea for aid and cut imports from Cuba by 95%. To contrast, the economic policy of the USSR in Cuba thrived off the deterioration of relations between the US and Cuba. In 1960, the Soviet Union signed an agreement to buy 1,000,000 tonnes of sugar per year for the next 5 years, tying the two countries together and resulting in there being a Communist country in the western sphere of influence. By viewing the economic policies taken by the US and the USSR it is clear that they both stem from differing political motives. The US antagonised Cuba because of their domination of the country pre-revolution which clearly resulted in a much more restrictive economic policy, whereas the USSR was keen to spread communism to the West and thus cemented relations with Cuba by supporting the economy generously through its agreement on its expenditure on grain. I would argue that the economic policies in Cuba were a minor cause for the Cuban Missile Crisis though nonetheless they did act as an early catalyst for the events which would follow shortly after in Cuba. Comparing the economic policies in both crises, it is apparent that the US/USSR influence on the German economies had a much more direct impact on Berlin and the whole of Germany and was an important cause for the crisis in 1961. But in Cuba, the economic policies were enforced at an early stage and though they exacerbated tensions between the US and the USSR, they had more of an indirect impact on the crisis as they provided the foundations for the non-confrontational military conflict between the two sides which followed.

 

Lastly, it is necessary to cover the military policy chosen by both sides and to assess whether this can be regarded as a factor which caused a crisis. In truth, the military policy from the two sides was far-fetched and less important than the socioeconomic and political policies. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff made refining contingency plans for various military probes of the railway to Berlin and they were prepared to implement a blockade similar to Stalin’s blockade in 1948-49. There was also an understanding that the Allies lacked military strength so the US and NATO were advised to build up their military power. On the other hand, Khrushchev largely exaggerated the military capability of the USSR with the hope that this would force the Allies to withdraw from West Berlin, recognise the legal existence of the USSR and recognise the GDR’s right to control Berlin’s borders. Comparing these military policies one can argue that they simply cannot be seen as a cause for the Berlin Crisis of 1961 as they were never put into effect. They were merely extended precautions for the potentiality of a conflict between the two sides. The US initially adopted an offensive military policy in Cuba which soon transformed itself into a defensive policy. This can be seen in the Bay of Pigs Fiasco when the CIA trained 1,500 exiles to overthrow Castro in 1959. However, the military policy of the US in Cuba post 1959 was arguably more defensive in the sense that 180 ships, a fleet of submarines and 156 ICBM’s were deployed as a defence mechanism against the serious possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack. The USSR however were always warningly offensive immediately before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis with the Soviet deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles defended by 40,000 Soviet troops, anti-aircraft batteries, short-range battlefield rockets and MIG-21 fighter planes. From this we can infer that the military policy posed by the Soviets was with the intention of escalating tensions so dangerously that the world was on the cusp of nuclear war if the US were to make a mistake which further pushed the buttons of the USSR. The US military policy, specifically during the crisis, was merely retaliatory, as naturally, the US recognised a need to defend itself at all costs. Therefore we can make the assumption that the military policies taken by both sides were in fact factors which caused the Cuban Missile Crisis but I would argue that the US should be seen as the scapegoat because they had previously deployed nuclear weaponry in Turkey and Italy prior to the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba. If we are to compare the military policies between these two crises it is obvious that what differs between these crises is that in Cuba there was a clear motivation that if worst came to worst, a military/nuclear conflict was inevitable, so we can argue from the perspective that there was certainly more of a need for a strict military policy in Cuba as opposed to in Berlin where the possibility of a nuclear war had not yet become real enough.

 

To conclude, I have argued my case that the policies adopted from both the US and the USSR in each of the crises can be seen as the causes for the crises themselves. In Berlin it would seem that the socioeconomic and political policies were the main causes for the crisis in 1961 but I would argue that the political policies taken from both sides is what allows these other policies to also contribute to the causation of the crisis. The differing ideologies immediately separated the two sides which ultimately allowed for a conflict in interests in how to deal with Germany, despite various attempts to reach an agreement to re-unite Germany. Similar to Berlin, the policies undertaken during the Cuban Missile Crisis are all linked to the contrasting capitalist/communist political ideologies and the innate fear of what each side was capable of. I personally perceive the military policy as the main cause for the crisis largely due to the deployment of nuclear weaponry being an indication that nuclear war was almost unavoidable. Comparing the two crises to each other, interestingly I would argue that the Cuban Missile Crisis might not have occurred had it not been for the Berlin Crisis the year before. My reasoning behind this is that the Berlin Crisis highlighted that the capitalist modus viventi seemed to be much more popular than the communist way of life. Because of this, Khrushchev undoubtedly felt deeply threatened by the West and the only way to suppress the domination of the US and to gain popular support was to create a hole in its Western sphere through the establishment of a communist state that was co-ordinated by COMINFORM. The title is suggestive that the policies, the causes of and the crises themselves were all separate to each other but I would argue the opposite and that each of these factors support each other. Finally, I believe that it is unfair for the policies adopted by the US and the USSR in Berlin and Cuba to be compared to each other as the Berlin Crisis can be viewed as a national crisis which involved the US and the USSR, whereas Cuba was arguably a global crisis which was applicable to the world.