The period from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 up until the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924, was described by historian Russell Tarr as a “baptism of fire”. Marxist-Leninist historian Dmitri Volkogonov further commentated that “The movement for a just and classless society in Russia began with unbridled violence, denying millions of people all rights except the right to support Bolshevik policy.” Though these two perspectives on the state of Russia are far-fetched from each other, they both have implications that the transformation of a state that was economically broken, socially disintegrated and ideologically divided could only be achieved through brute force, a repression of democracy and a new dictatorship. The spring of 1918 only confirmed the deterioration of the economy with the collapse of the value of the rouble and soaring inflation. I will be examining the economic policies undertaken in Russia, from the campaign of “War Communism”, which a Leftist would argue was Lenin’s avid response to the civil war, to Trotsky’s proposal of a “New Economic Policy” that would at least provide the Russian populace with a little prosperity. Alongside my analysis of the economic policies, I will incorporate the various perspectives of the different groups that made up Russian society, whether it be from the angle of a Bolshevik Party member or from a Kronstadt sailor. Wherever necessary, I will also add the perspectives of well-regarded historians to support my arguments.
To begin with, post-revisionist historian Robert Service states that Lenin was “determined that the Bolsheviks should initiate the achievement of a world without exploitation and oppression.”. Though this was Lenin’s ideal picture of his utopian communist Russia, there is some fault with what Service says. One of the reasons as to why there was such a resentment for the economic policies was because of Lenin’s reliance on oppression of the Russian people in order to maintain the power and influence of the Bolshevik regime, and the peasantry were no doubt subject to this. Grain requisition and forced collectivisation was introduced as a result of the loss of Ukraine and the disbanding of highly profitable farms. Russell Tarr estimates that around 6,000,000 peasants lost their lives down to starvation because of War Communism. From this we can argue that one of the reasons as to why there was so much opposition to Russia’s economic policy was simply because it seemed to be doing a lot more damage than good. Though War Communism succeeded in providing the needs for Russia in the short term, it was simply not feasible to prolong this campaign as it had the effect of deteriorating the social conditions of Russia parallel to the crumbling of the economy. It seemed that the rights of the individual were ignored so long as the collective could continue to operate during the campaign. Orlando Figes points out the sheer lengths of terror the Bolshevik requisition squads resorted to in order to take the grain from the peasantry. Raping of the village folk and burning of villages were not an uncommon form of Bolshevik activity. Figes registers that the only reason as to why the peasantry complied to War Communism was purely out of fear and that indeed opposition to the Bolshevik regime and its economic policies was certainly rife, reflected in the outbreak of peasant rebellions. The disregard for the peasantry is what prompted Lenin to issue the New Economic Policy in which he said “Let the peasants have their little bit of capitalism as long as we have the power” when he realised that he could not afford to face increasing opposition from the peasantry, who made up the majority of Russia.
Furthermore, the worker class were another faction of the Russian community who were opposed to the economic policies laid forth by the Bolshevik Party. Figes points out that “the Bolsheviks themselves were talking about the disappearance of the working class by the spring of 1918”. Workers’ strikes were very common, even before the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921, all denouncing the new dictatorship Lenin was establishing. This was as a result of hostile opinion against Lenin’s introduction of compulsory labour for all citizens between 16-50 years of age and his creation of Vesenkha (the Supreme Council of the National Economy) which limited the power of the Workers’ Councils. We can acetate from this that War Communism was responded to with general resentment and that the workers were as much opposed to the economic policy as the peasants were. Gorky even went so far as to claim that “many workers spat whenever they heard the name of the Bolsheviks mentioned.” Most workers were bitterly opposed to the economic policies in Russia, however, the different groups had different reasons for being so. SR and Menshevik activists were against the Bolshevik regime entirely, regardless of the Bolshevik economic policies, as their vision of how Russia should be governed unsurprisingly differed greatly to the Bolsheviks’; to them, War Communism was simply driven by Bolshevik ideology. War Communism only provided these people with another reason to hate the Bolsheviks (the SR’s had already rejected the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) given that it seemed that nobody was really benefiting from it at all. This assumption is supported by the formation of the protest movement, “The Extraordinary Assemblies of Factory and Plant Representatives”, which was regarded as the most powerful and threatening anti-Bolshevik protest movement formed from the working class.
To add to the opposition of the workers to the economic policies, a “third toilers” revolution, this time in opposition to the Bolsheviks, was taking place. The Kronstadt rebellion, led by 16,000 soldiers and workers was instigated by the detestation over how little three years of communism had benefited Russia. Though the partakers of the rebellion were very much against the Bolshevik Party, they were once “the pride and joy of the revolution”. It is interesting to acknowledge how quickly Kronstadt gave up on the Bolsheviks, leaving us to question their reasons for being so opposed to the economic policies issued by the Bolsheviks. Bad harvests and grain requisition brought on famine and widespread suffering in both rural and urban Russia. The Kronstadt Soviet became a national voice which spoke out about the oppression of Russian communities, suggested in a Kronstadt resolution demanding “The liberation of all political prisoners of the Socialist parties, and for all imprisoned workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors belonging to workers and peasant organizations.” The Kronstadt can be seen as the “ideological club” against Leninism, they were the voice of the masses. So it is no surprise that the Bolsheviks faced even more opposition against their economic policies when they decided to stamp out the revolt through brutality, dissolving the Kronstadt Soviet, executing hundreds of ringleaders and expelling over 15,000 sailors from the Kronstadt fleet. We could argue that opposition against the economic policies was not just because of their unpopularity, but because of blatant ideological opposition to the Bolsheviks. Many were already discontent with the Bolsheviks’ brutal and repressive measures, they had made little progress since their victory in the civil war, so a controversial economic policy might just have been another factor that prompted people to oppose the party as a whole and not just simply its economic policies.
Alternatively, there was also strong opposition against the economic policies within the Bolshevik Party itself. A lot of emphasis has been placed on the opposition against War Communism and it would seem that it did retrieve much more widespread hatred as opposed to the New Economic Policy. However, to put it blunt, War Communism was encouraged by most Bolsheviks and detested by the rest of Russia, whereas the NEP was generally appreciated by Russians but was very divisive within the Bolshevik Party. Bolshevik Party members Shiliapnikov and Kollantai were opposed to reducing the power of the Trades Unions and the Workers’ Councils supported by the Democratic Centralists who resented the “dictatorship of party officialdom”. The Bolsheviks were the driving force for War Communism given that they could not rely on the rest of Russia to promote the policy, but given that Bolshevik Party members were opposed to the activities of the party, shows that it was not just anti-Bolsheviks who sought to oppose the Bolshevik regime, but the very advocators themselves. This is further emphasised by the divisiveness within the party over the NEP. Western historians such as Stephen Cohen would greatly sympathise for Right-Wing Bolshevik, Bukharin who defended the peasant-based socialism of the NEP. However, historian Mikhail Gorinov views the New Economic Policy very pessimistically, stating that ‘the threat of technical backwardness, the permanent danger of war, and the instability of the market cast very gravedoubt on the effectiveness of this variant’. And this is a very similar reflection of the divisiveness within the Bolshevik Party – the Right and the Left. Perhaps the most notable Leftist, Trotsky, was opposed to the New Economic Policy as he believed it to be a policy of ideological betrayal as it allowed elements of petty capitalism to return to Russia, which was completely undermining the purpose of socialism. It also stimulated opposition within the party as it allowed for an emergence of new Kulak and Nepmen classes who posed a threat to the party itself.
To conclude, I deem it fair to assume that there was much more widespread opposition against the Bolsheviks’ War Communism campaign as opposed to the New Economic Policy. However, this essay is not asking for comparisons between these two economic policies but merely for reasons as to why there was opposition. Having assessed the different perspectives from which the economic policies were seen, I’ve argued that it is unjust to simply assume that the overriding reason for discontent for the economic policies was purely because of their failures, for which I would stress much more emphasis on War Communism. Though this is a vital factor that must not be ignored, factors such as a strong number of anti-Bolshevik ideologues, divisions within the Bolshevik Party and the long-lasting effects of these policies must all be taken with as great an importance for reasons for opposition. And though this question extends itself to 1924, I would argue along with many other historians that the opposition against the Bolshevik economic policies ended in 1921, with the end of War Communism; if not so throughout the whole of Russia, definitely for those who were not involved directly with the Party. It is also interesting to consider the evolution of this opposition, as it would seem that between 1917-21, the economic policy conducted in Russia was very much a problem external to the Party, however in the years proceeding 1921, this transformed into an internal problem for the Party that most certainly did damage to its reputation and its socialist ideology which it had built itself upon.
History is our Future 