Compare and contrast the causes of, and the policies of the USA and the USSR during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

Photograph taken by a U-2 Spy Plane of Missile bases on Cuba

The aftermath of the Berlin Blockade demonstrated a clear ideological division between the US and the USSR as the West wished to rebuild the Germany economy in contrast to the USSR which wanted to continue with the repression of Germany in order to stamp out the potential threat a powerful Germany might pose. This led to the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic which only exacerbated tensions between the West and the East as these two countries became a physical division between capitalist and communist states. The partition of Germany indefinitely worsened problems in the long term as competing US and USSR foreign policies ultimately led to the construction of the Berlin Wall at 2:00 A.M. August 13th, 1961. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year revealed a further deterioration in relations between the US and the USSR with the USSR adopting a warningly offensive policy in contrast to the US which had no choice but to adopt a defensive policy in order to suppress the potentiality of a nuclear attack. Also, unlike the crisis of Berlin, a hardline military policy was taken by both sides which arguably had the result of bringing these two superpowers to the very brink of nuclear war. It is important to register that in order to answer this question, we must take into account that the policies of both countries can also be viewed as the causes for these crises. This essay will divide the foreign policies of both countries into: economic policies; political policies, social policies and military policies whilst also comparing the effects of these policies in terms of creating a crisis. 

To begin with, it can be argued that the differing political policies adopted by both sides was indeed a factor in itself which can be seen as a cause for the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Life in the East was dominated by the Communist Party. East Germany was the only communist single party state which had effectively been created from nothing and it became a representative model for which all communist states should follow. No other political parties were permitted and elections comprised of a number of candidates which had been selected by the Communist Party. The reason for Khrushchev wanting to exert a large amount of Soviet influence in Berlin was because of the pre-existing fear of another German invasion of Russia with there having already been one in 1914 and another in 1941. Though we must take into account that Khrushchev wanted the two German states to co-exist with each other similar to his desire for the acceptance of co-existence between the US and the USSR. To contrast, the Western political policy in both West Germany and West Berlin was indeed much more liberal and allowed for the flourishing of Germany, inevitably attracting East Germans to cross the de facto border between these two countries. However, both US and USSR political policies were similar in the sense that they both wished for German unity, but the Geneva Conference of 1959 and Camp David Summit highlighted a failure from both sides to agree on each other’s proposals. From this we can argue that the inability from both sides to accept each other’s political proposals and thus political ideologies in fact contributed greatly to the eventual construction of the Wall. It can be seen that in Cuba, the political policies undertaken by both sides were indeed largely focussed on being effective in the short term. Politically, the Soviet’s influence in Cuba was to essentially worry the US that there was now a communist state 120km away from American soil. It can be perceived that the political policy of the USSR was a protectionist policy in the sense that the adoption of Cuba into the Soviet sphere of influence was more because the Soviets wanted to deter the threat of a US attack; stabilising missiles within Cuba was simply a way in allowing this. Contrarily, the political policy adopted by the US was highly defensive as well as an example of its policy of containment. The need for a defensive policy was strengthened by Castro’s coup in 1959 and his announcement that he had shifted from an anti-US Cuban nationalist to a communist. If we are to compare the political policies of both these crises it can be viewed that though it eventually failed, politically the US and the USSR were much more willing to compromise over Germany as opposed to the crisis in Cuba which highlighted that these two sides were indeed polar opposites. The political policies in both crises can also be seen as the foundations for the social policies adopted by these countries.

 

The social policies of the USSR in East Berlin and East Germany were very restrictive and worked to repress the ordinary Berliner. Though the eastern region of Germany claimed to be democratic, it was in fact far from it. In comparison to the treatment of western Germans, the Soviet system in East Germany was very much oppressive and the USSR social policy in Berlin can thus also be viewed as this. The newspaper, radio and television were all controlled and the secret police, the Staatssicherheit, was responsible for both political surveillance and espionage. To contrast, the social policies imposed on West Berlin by the US, Britain and France were much more liberal likewise to their political policies. It became readily apparent that life in West Berlin brought more prosperity, with average wages being much higher than in the east as well as there being no secret police and no censorship. The completely contrasting social policies adopted by both sides in Berlin can be seen as a cause for the crisis. The migration of defectors from West Berlin to East Berlin created a “brain drain” (a loss of highly educated people) for the USSR’s East Berlin with there being over 10,000 defectors per week by 1961, significantly increasing tensions between the two sides. If anything, the varied growth of both East and West Berlin and the social prosperity of West Berlin only added to there being a crisis in Berlin as Khrushchev was led to believe that the only feasible way to deal with the inferiority of the East in relation to the West was to physically cut off both sides from each other with a wall. In Cuba, it can be argued that the social policies from both sides were perhaps not as distinguishable as the social policies in Berlin. However, the USSR’s social policy if anything was one that was very friendly to the Cuban populace with Khrushchev threatening in July 1960 to send Soviet troops to Cuba to defend the island if the US dared invade it. This amicable social stance taken by the USSR was mostly because of the USSR’s recognition of the importance of having a communist state in the Western Hemisphere. Whereas, the US social policy was much more offensive and threatening. Evidence of this can be seen in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, April 1961 in which Kennedy sent a force of around 1400 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs with the hope that this would trigger a popular uprising against Fidel Castro. Comparing the social policies adopted by both sides in each of the crises, we can acetate that it was not so much the social policies themselves that caused a crisis to happen but it was actually the conflict between these two differing social policies adopted by the US and the USSR which exacerbated the climate for a crisis to occur.

 

Moreover, it can be suggested that the economic policies of both the US and the USSR were in fact similar to the social policies imposed on both western and eastern Berlin as well as these policies stemming from very contrasting politically ideological perspectives. The USSR, though it claimed that it allowed for democratic freedom within both East Berlin and East Germany, actually repressed the East German economy (including East Berlin). In East Berlin, consumer goods were limited and often of poor quality. Sales of foreign goods were restricted and currency sales were strictly controlled in an effort to obtain foreign exchange. Essentially Khrushchev wanted to modernise the East German economy but under very strict supervision. Whereas the economy in West Berlin and indeed West Germany was flourishing at a much faster rate to its eastern competitor and promised a much more satisfying life for its citizens which can be seen that in the first 7 months of 1961, 207,00 defectors had left East Germany to settle in the west. From this we can infer that these two juxtaposing economies were a direct cause for the crisis of 1961. It became clear that the economic policies of the US, Britain and France were far superior and much more preferable to the German populace than the repressive economic stance taken by the USSR. It can be argued that the economic policies of both sides was the main cause for the construction of the Berlin Wall as it was built to block the loss of intellectuals from the East which if anything was caused by the differing economic policies. In Cuba it is perhaps sensible to assume that a strategic economic policy in Cuba was not a priority and that the US and USSR channelled a lot more effort into their military and political policies instead. However, the US’ imposition of an embargo on Cuba in 1962 crippled the Cuban economy greatly and demonstrated a dramatic souring of strong US-Cuban relations which had existed prior to the Cuban revolution. President Eisenhower declined Castro’s plea for aid and cut imports from Cuba by 95%. To contrast, the economic policy of the USSR in Cuba thrived off the deterioration of relations between the US and Cuba. In 1960, the Soviet Union signed an agreement to buy 1,000,000 tonnes of sugar per year for the next 5 years, tying the two countries together and resulting in there being a Communist country in the western sphere of influence. By viewing the economic policies taken by the US and the USSR it is clear that they both stem from differing political motives. The US antagonised Cuba because of their domination of the country pre-revolution which clearly resulted in a much more restrictive economic policy, whereas the USSR was keen to spread communism to the West and thus cemented relations with Cuba by supporting the economy generously through its agreement on its expenditure on grain. I would argue that the economic policies in Cuba were a minor cause for the Cuban Missile Crisis though nonetheless they did act as an early catalyst for the events which would follow shortly after in Cuba. Comparing the economic policies in both crises, it is apparent that the US/USSR influence on the German economies had a much more direct impact on Berlin and the whole of Germany and was an important cause for the crisis in 1961. But in Cuba, the economic policies were enforced at an early stage and though they exacerbated tensions between the US and the USSR, they had more of an indirect impact on the crisis as they provided the foundations for the non-confrontational military conflict between the two sides which followed.

 

Lastly, it is necessary to cover the military policy chosen by both sides and to assess whether this can be regarded as a factor which caused a crisis. In truth, the military policy from the two sides was far-fetched and less important than the socioeconomic and political policies. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff made refining contingency plans for various military probes of the railway to Berlin and they were prepared to implement a blockade similar to Stalin’s blockade in 1948-49. There was also an understanding that the Allies lacked military strength so the US and NATO were advised to build up their military power. On the other hand, Khrushchev largely exaggerated the military capability of the USSR with the hope that this would force the Allies to withdraw from West Berlin, recognise the legal existence of the USSR and recognise the GDR’s right to control Berlin’s borders. Comparing these military policies one can argue that they simply cannot be seen as a cause for the Berlin Crisis of 1961 as they were never put into effect. They were merely extended precautions for the potentiality of a conflict between the two sides. The US initially adopted an offensive military policy in Cuba which soon transformed itself into a defensive policy. This can be seen in the Bay of Pigs Fiasco when the CIA trained 1,500 exiles to overthrow Castro in 1959. However, the military policy of the US in Cuba post 1959 was arguably more defensive in the sense that 180 ships, a fleet of submarines and 156 ICBM’s were deployed as a defence mechanism against the serious possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack. The USSR however were always warningly offensive immediately before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis with the Soviet deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles defended by 40,000 Soviet troops, anti-aircraft batteries, short-range battlefield rockets and MIG-21 fighter planes. From this we can infer that the military policy posed by the Soviets was with the intention of escalating tensions so dangerously that the world was on the cusp of nuclear war if the US were to make a mistake which further pushed the buttons of the USSR. The US military policy, specifically during the crisis, was merely retaliatory, as naturally, the US recognised a need to defend itself at all costs. Therefore we can make the assumption that the military policies taken by both sides were in fact factors which caused the Cuban Missile Crisis but I would argue that the US should be seen as the scapegoat because they had previously deployed nuclear weaponry in Turkey and Italy prior to the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba. If we are to compare the military policies between these two crises it is obvious that what differs between these crises is that in Cuba there was a clear motivation that if worst came to worst, a military/nuclear conflict was inevitable, so we can argue from the perspective that there was certainly more of a need for a strict military policy in Cuba as opposed to in Berlin where the possibility of a nuclear war had not yet become real enough.

 

To conclude, I have argued my case that the policies adopted from both the US and the USSR in each of the crises can be seen as the causes for the crises themselves. In Berlin it would seem that the socioeconomic and political policies were the main causes for the crisis in 1961 but I would argue that the political policies taken from both sides is what allows these other policies to also contribute to the causation of the crisis. The differing ideologies immediately separated the two sides which ultimately allowed for a conflict in interests in how to deal with Germany, despite various attempts to reach an agreement to re-unite Germany. Similar to Berlin, the policies undertaken during the Cuban Missile Crisis are all linked to the contrasting capitalist/communist political ideologies and the innate fear of what each side was capable of. I personally perceive the military policy as the main cause for the crisis largely due to the deployment of nuclear weaponry being an indication that nuclear war was almost unavoidable. Comparing the two crises to each other, interestingly I would argue that the Cuban Missile Crisis might not have occurred had it not been for the Berlin Crisis the year before. My reasoning behind this is that the Berlin Crisis highlighted that the capitalist modus viventi seemed to be much more popular than the communist way of life. Because of this, Khrushchev undoubtedly felt deeply threatened by the West and the only way to suppress the domination of the US and to gain popular support was to create a hole in its Western sphere through the establishment of a communist state that was co-ordinated by COMINFORM. The title is suggestive that the policies, the causes of and the crises themselves were all separate to each other but I would argue the opposite and that each of these factors support each other. Finally, I believe that it is unfair for the policies adopted by the US and the USSR in Berlin and Cuba to be compared to each other as the Berlin Crisis can be viewed as a national crisis which involved the US and the USSR, whereas Cuba was arguably a global crisis which was applicable to the world.

Was Russia on the brink of revolution by 1914?

The 1905 October Manifesto brought significant change to the political culture of Russia. If the events of 1905 cannot be labelled as a revolution, they still contributed greatly to the most important and far-reaching change that Russia had experienced in its political history. For the first time, the Tsar did not have absolute power over the political system of Russia and the creation of the duma only encouraged the belief that Russia was now being governed by a constitutional monarchy as opposed to an absolute one. In the short-term, the constitutional reforms issued by the Tsar brought about a period of dramatic economic and social recovery, only strengthening the argument that Russia was embarking on a path of evolution into a great European power and weakening the perception that the only solution to Russia’s turmoil was a revolution. There are two ways to answering the aforementioned question. An optimist historian will argue that from 1905 onwards, Russia was undergoing a gradual evolution into a more modernised and advanced state driven by its industrial and social success, Stolypin’s agrarian reforms and the achievements of the duma. However, a pessimist will argue that Russia was drawing continuously closer to a revolution. The dangerous rise of workers’ protests, the lack of improvement on the living conditions of the peasantry and the persecution of minority groups heavily support this claim that by 1914 Russia was indeed tip-toeing on the fine line that separated itself from a revolution. Both of these conflicting views will be discussed throughout the essay and where necessary, the arguments proposed by distinguished historians will also be incorporated to strengthen these views. Also, though Russia never actually submitted itself to a revolution by 1914, I will assess whether the conditions that had been created through economic, social and political factors dating back to the 1905 October Manifesto were enough to certify the belief that Russia was on the verge of a revolution had it not been for the outbreak of the war in 1914 which, arguably had the effect of either transforming the situation in Russia or being the catalyst needed to bring about revolution in 1917.

 

To begin with, an optimist will view the social and industrial improvement of Russia as an evolutionary step for its modernisation and if anything, a deterrent to the idea of a revolution by 1914. In the years following 1905, Russia had asserted itself as the fifth greatest industrial power with its rate of industrial growth between 1908-1913 at an impressive 8% and its coal and steel production rising by nearly 50%. Coupled with this, the Third Duma increased government spending on elementary schools from 1.8% of the budget to 4.2% and the period following 1905 saw a 77% growth in the number of pupils as well as the literacy rate increasing by 15% by 1914. From the view of the optimists these enormous developments are substantial evidence that Russia had indeed vastly modernised itself industrially with the improvement of its social standards running parallel to this. One might argue that Russia was nowhere near the brink of a revolution by 1914 with its industrial and social improvements supporting the idea that it was only evolving into a more constitutional and socially-accepted state. Gigantism had a massive impact on industrial success with factories that held more than 1000 workers showing a 10% increase in its number of workers. My point is, industrialisation brought employment, satisfying the bulk of the Russian populace and thus steering them away from any revolutionary intent. This if anything is enough to assume that Russia was by no means near a revolution by 1914. It is correct to recognise that progress was slow, but positive change was occurring to the satisfaction of the Russian people, a lot of progress had actually been made since 1905, enough to greatly dishearten a desire for revolution. However, from the perspective of the pessimists, Russia’s social and industrial changes were simply enforced too late and that these modernisations only highlighted a clear division between the classes. Despite the improvements made, the number of industrial workers grew to over 3 million and conditions were not improved alongside this staggering growth. In 1914 there was still only a small number of Russian children who attended school and the educational curriculum for these schools was simply too basic. Russia’s backwardness in education can be seen as detrimental as it highlighted that there was no real effort being made to promote the teaching of the youth population, encouraging the idea that the government was afraid that a new and educated youth would encourage criticism of the autocracy. There was also very small numbers of doctors and teachers in the rural areas, revealing the massive social gap between the educated and the peasantry. One might argue that this provided a solid foundation for a revolution as it seemed that the social reforms of Russia were actually failing to keep up with the vast industrial reforms which were occurring at the same time. This only left the overwhelming majority of Russia (the peasantry) dissatisfied, as both their working and living conditions had been given very little acknowledgement and they were actually failing to benefit from these changes at all. It is reasonable to perceive that Russia was modernising itself on a larger scale rather than focussing on improving conditions for the individual. The ignorance of the peasantry understandably stirred hatred among the masses amplifying the conditions for revolution.  Gigantism can be seen as only contributing to the spread of revolutionary ideas in trade unions allowing the peasantry to unite in one justified cause to work to bring down the autocracy. Protests such as the 1912 Lena Goldifelds Massacre emphasise that Russia was indeed on the brink of revolution by 1914 as the peasants’ hatred of the autocracy was actually so widespread that it was simply too difficult to manage the rebelliousness of the bulk of the Russian people.

 

Furthermore, historian Michael Florinsky argues that the constitutional changes brought to Russia improved the democratic rights of the Russian people, commentating that “the door to these [democratic] changes was now open“. Indeed membership in the duma of political parties and trade unions was allowed after 1906 and serfs were given the right to vote in national elections. Tsar Nicholas II did not have the authority to dispense with elected Dumas, despite having made confrontations with the first two. The Third Duma also played a very constructive role in promoting educational expansion and improving on Stolypin’s agrarian reforms. The creation of a duma in itself can be seen as a massive political breakthrough for Russia as it was the ultimate sign that the power of the Tsar was reducing and that the democratic rights of peasants were being increased, thus supporting Florinsky’s view. Florinsky would argue that Russia was nowhere near the brink of revolution by 1914 as it was slowly evolving towards a system of parliamentary democracy, even if the Tsar himself disagreed with the transformation of the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy. Conversely, Richard Charques adopts a more pessimistic view of the constitutional reforms and believes that they only catalyse Russia to the brink of revolution by 1914. His claim is that Russia had transformed itself into a “demi-semi constitutional monarchy“, essentially implying that the constitutional changes made were exploited by the interference of the autocracy. Nicholas II had only laid out the October Manifesto to save the monarchy and his 1906 Fundamental Laws made it clear that “Supreme Autocratic Power belongs to the emperor” and that “no law can come into his force without his approval.“. Charques argues that though the duma was created and there were constitutional reforms, democracy was in fact severely limited so that the autocracy would still have a large influence on the politics of the country. This is supported by the fact that the duma was bicameral which allowed the upper class to dominate the political scene. Also, 600 trades unions were shut down by 1911 and both the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries had their applications for registration turned down. If anything, democracy had been severely reduced and the duma can be seen as a tool to camouflage the interference of the autocracy. Such democratic repression surely escalated tensions between the autocracy and the Russian people and only encouraged reformists to become revolutionaries due to the repression of their political freedom. From a pessimistic view, Nicholas II was losing the confidence of the nation and was leading Russia into, according to Guchkov, leader of the Octobrist Party, an “inevitable and grave catastrophe” i.e. revolution.

   

The Duma

 

 Moreover, Peter Stolypin’s agrarian reforms can be seen as a success that helped transform Russia for the greater good. His “wager on the strong” reforms aimed at the break-up of the commune and its replacement by a new class of prosperous peasants who would both promote economic modernisation and ensure social stability. Prior to 1914, there had been an initial rush to register lands in individual ownership and it has been calculated that around half the peasant households in the Empire had private ownership. Stolypin’s reforms arguably managed to stamp out the idea of revolution among the peasantry. Indeed Lenin saw the reforms as a threat to his plan of enthusing the peasants’ protests into a workers’ revolution so we might view Stolypin’s reforms as a barrier to revolution as it drove peasants away from a revolutionary path and kept them as reactionary. We can view his reforms as a painful but hopeful beginning. Though Stolypin’s reforms achieved success in the southern regions and not the entirety of Russia, we must recognise that by 1914, 25% of peasants had left the communes and 10% had consolidated their holdings. Stolypin’s reforms  can be seen as controversial as they offered perhaps too much freedom to the peasantry, but the figures support the assumption that they actually worked in satisfying the peasantry whilst also satisfying the government as the need for political concessions was reduced. The reforms actually eroded the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and therefore it is fair to assume that preceding the First World War, Stolypin’s reforms did not provide the climate for a revolution in 1914 and thus we might have to rely on the war itself as being the game-changer that transformed the conditions of Russia, giving it more reason for a revolution. On the other hand,  historian Martin McCauley suggests that Stolypin’s reforms were “likely to have only moderate success in Russia in the short term“. He adds that Stolypin’s predictions that his reforms would take twenty years to operate effectively were simply not good enough as the reforms required fast growth in the rest of the economy to siphon off surplus rural labour as well as changed attitudes and a higher cultural level among the peasantry. It is thus justifiable to argue that his attempts at solving the agrarian issue were launched too late to have the effect he expected. With more than 80% of the Russian population dependant on the land, there were simply too many peasants trying to earn a living from farming. This allowed for the peasantry to feel much of the hardships that came with the modernisation of Russia, encouraging resentment towards the autocracy and thus undermining the agrarian reforms issued by Stolypin. Stolypin’s assassination  in 1911 is enough in itself to support the perception that by 1914, Russia was indeed on the brink of a revolution. Though his reforms were the first serious attempt to tackle peasant backwardness and overpopulation in the rural areas. The flaw to Stolypin’s reforms was time, and they failed to solve the agrarian issue at all in the short term only adding to the peasants’ anger and strengthening the argument that by 1914 the climate of Russia was indeed in a state in which revolution was imminent, with the First World War simply delaying its happening.

 

Having already assessed the industrial and social climate of Russia prior to 1914, it is important to analyse the treatment of industrial workers and minority groups and whether this adds to the reasoning that by 1914 Russia was on the brink of a revolution. The government, sensing the very high threat posed by revolutionary parties, sought to diminish their social standing in Russia. The Social Democratic Party was reduced from 150,000 in 1906 to 10,000. As well as this, the leaders of revolutionary groups were exiled and members of these groups were harassed by the police. The government campaign to dissolve these revolutionary groups effectively worked  and as a result, the groups were having sufficient difficulty in spreading revolutionary ideas. We can argue that Russia simply was not on the verge of revolution purely because revolutionary groups were weak and scattered due to governmental interference; they could hardly act with effectiveness and thus posed only a minor threat to the tsarist regime. Moreover, it can be argued that Russian nationalism effectively deterred the need for revolution as it brought the nation together. The 1906 Fundamental Laws promoted Russification stating that Russians should be “one and indivisible” implying that they should unite with the common aim to essentially russify the non-Russian populace. This if anything deflected social and industrial tensions and reduced the threat of a revolution as Russians were encouraged to blame the Jewish community for Russia’s social issues with the Anti-Semitic group the “Black Hundreds” organising the deaths of thousands of Jews in 1906. Revolution was thus perhaps unthinkable by 1914 as the strategy to nationalise the Russian people actually increased unity between them and diverted attention away from revolution and placed the blame for the upset the Russian people felt on the ethnic minority groups. Conversely, one might argue that the persecution of non-Russian groups encouraged antagonism which in turn led these minority groups to support and to join the revolutionary groups. The Tsar seems to have been unaware of the fact that the progress of modernisation and industrialisation were failing to solve the growing resentment the peasants had for the regime. The refusal to allow minority groups a federal state and the need to convert these groups to the Russian way of life only planted the seeds for radical, revolutionary beliefs to spread through the peasantry, indeed strengthening the claim that by 1914, revolution was almost certain to happen, it was only a matter of when it would. Added to this, the number of strikes over poor living conditions for the peasantry had increased from 2,000 in 1912 to over 3,000 by 1914 supporting the idea that the majority of the Russian population faced an ever-growing hostility towards the autocracy. Revolution was highly expected by 1914 due to a combination of detestation from various groups for the current autocracy. The combination of the Jewish groups, national minority groups and the workers themselves only solidifies the assumption that a revolution was impossible to prevent by 1914 given the sheer amount of opposition to the current autocratic system.

 

Finally, having discussed the ways in which the government dealt with non-Russians and revolutionaries in general, it is vital to analyse the actual strength of the revolutionary groups in more depth in order to consider how much of a threat they posed to the existing government with their revolutionary intentions. The optimists would argue that though they existed and did have some influence on the Duma, these revolutionary groups did not sufficiently heighten the probability of there being a revolution by 1914. Prominent revolutionary groups such as the SR’s and Mensheviks had been significantly weakened pre-1914 with there being divisions amongst the leadership of the party and between the leadership and the rank and file. This suggests that revolutionary groups did not actually contribute greatly to the building up of revolutionary tension. The lack of leadership and the poor organisation only numbed any worries that these groups could have a strong influence on the Russian population. Added to this, the Social Democrats occupied the least number of seats in the Duma after the Trudoviks, allowing the reactionaries to dominate the assemblies and to prevent the SD party from having much of an effect. If anything, one might argue that Russia was not even close to revolution by 1914 because the opposing parties were so weak, allowing themselves to be controlled by the autocracy and suppressed by the overwhelming majority of Octobrists in the Duma. Double agents such as Evno Azef and Roman Malinovsky were employed by the Okhrana to exploit the revolutionary groups in which they did, transmitting key information back to the police. Revolution was simply defused by the sheer lengths at which the government went to suppress the anti-government groups thus hardly creating the conditions for a revolution by 1914. However, from the perspective of the pessimists, these revolutionary groups increased social tensions so much to the point that by 1914 a revolution was in fact very believable. Revolutionary agitation had only increased since the Lena Goldfields Massacre of 1912 and by 1914, the Bolsheviks had gained control of some of the biggest unions in St Petersburg and Moscow such as the Metalworkers Union. The Bolshevik paper, Pravda, had achieved a national circulation of 40,000 copies per issue, followed by the Menshevik paper which had managed 20,000. From this we can infer  that the threat of revolution was always overhanging in Russia and that the strength of these revolutionary groups should not be undermined as they clearly were able to produce a vast number of copies that would spread revolutionary belief throughout the whole of Russia. Though the government was able to target and diminish the stance of these revolutionary groups, their existence as well as the fact that they were seen as a highly dangerous threat is enough to assume that the government would not be able to control these revolutionary groups in the long term. So we can suggest that these revolutionary groups support the claim that by 1914 Russia was on the brink of revolution, but it is important to regard the First World War as the catalyst to allowing these revolutionary groups to gain more and more power up until 1917.

 

To conclude,  in order to establish whether I side with the belief that Russia was on the brink of revolution by 1914, it is important to register how the First World War should be seen. The First World War was a catalyst for revolution in 1917. Because of this assumption it is thus right to assume that Russia was indeed on the brink of a revolution by 1914. Having tackled the various  arguments taken from both sides over the social, economic and political policies it would seem that revolution was in fact inevitable, regardless of the time in which it would take place. The combination of the workers’ protests, the short-term failure of Stolypin’s reforms and the severe limitation of democracy within the Duma all significantly heightened tensions between the autocracy and the rest of Russian society. The situation was simply out of the Tsar’s hands because if he offered more freedom to the rest of the Russian population it would only encourage  the spread of radical, revolutionary beliefs and if he chose to repress the populace then he would lose the support of the masses and increase antagonism and hatred for the autocracy, a different route which would still lead to the same destination which is the  inevitability of revolution. This suggests that the reason for why the conditions for revolution had been put into effect by 1914 was not so much because of the failures of the autocracy but more because of the growing agitation that was spreading among the rest of Russia. We can therefore identify that the modernisation of Russia as a whole actually had more of a detrimental effect on the country as it was apparent that the flourishing of the individual could not run parallel to the flourishing of the state. Russia was more concerned with itself as a nation and its ignorance towards its people is the ultimate reason as to why by 1914 Russia had found itself on the brink of a revolution.